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PRIME MINISTERIRAQ/KUWAIT

You should be aware of one potentially worrying development affecting British nationals in Kuwait. Early this morning the Iraqis summoned in our Ambassador in Kuwait and insisted that "for their own safety" all members of the British community should be gathered in one location: the Regency Hotel. Our Ambassador has consulted EC colleagues in Kuwait to see whether they have had a similar demand. We have not yet had a read out on that. The FCO have informed the Red Cross and the UN Commissioner for Human Rights and our Mission in New York are raising it with Perez de Cuellar.

The MOD are consulting confidentially on the military net with other Western powers to see what contingency military action they have planned to protect nationals trapped in Kuwait and Iraq; and we are separately checking the legal basis for any such action.

A convoy of dependants and non-essential staff from the Embassy and the BLT in Kuwait are heading for Baghdad. Places on the convoy have been offered to any other UK citizen in Kuwait.

William Waldegrave is holding a Press conference this afternoon. He will cover the position of the convoy and, if the story has broken, the Iraqis' latest move on British residents in Kuwait.



DOMINIC MORRIS

16 August 1990CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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DOMINIC MORRIS

16 August 1990

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MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS BRIEFING

GIVEN BY FCO MINISTER OF STATE, MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE,

IN LONDON,

ON THURSDAY, 16 AUGUST 1990

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MR. WALDEGRAVE:

When I originally asked you to come in - and I am grateful to you for coming - I intended to have a broad-ranging press conference dealing with the whole situation. Since then, there has been a development which I regard as a grave and sinister development.

The Iraqi military authorities occupying Kuwait have instructed the British community, which numbers some thousands of people - men, women and children - to assemble at a hotel in Kuwait. It is clear to me that that cannot be because they believe that they are going to be, as they put it, "safer" in that hotel. I have no proof of this, but I fear that it is in preparation for moving those people somewhere else. I would like to express the anger of the British people if any such step is taken.

We are, of course, consulting our allies and our colleagues to find out whether similar demands have been made of other communities. We believe they have been made of the Americans and perhaps some others.

This is a further example of the duplicity of the Iraqi regime. Some of you may have heard the Iraqi Ambassador this very

MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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lunchtime talking about the safety of what he called "guests of the Iraqi people".

I hope that these reports and the storm of protest which will break around the head of Iraq if she pursues any policy of interning people will make her draw back even at this late stage from any such policy, if that is what she contemplates.

Thank you! As you can imagine, I have quite a lot now to do, so I will have to cut this a little short, but let us have a few questions!



MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL):

What was the reason given for assembling these people at one particular place? Are they to be treated as hostages or internees?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

The reason given was that it would be for their safety but that if they did not assemble, there would be trouble for them.

QUESTION:

What is the deadline for this assembly and where is it supposed to take place?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It takes place at the Regency Hotel in Kuwait.

QUESTION:

And this applies to all British residents?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

In Kuwait. There is as yet no clear deadline. We are, of course, urgently protesting in Baghdad and everywhere else.

QUESTION:

Are the diplomats affected?

MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I have asked the diplomats in the British Embassy in Kuwait that some of their number should join the assembling British community at the hotel so that if they are moved anywhere else there should be diplomats with them.

QUESTION:

But they are not required to leave officially?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

No.

QUESTION:

How many British people are we talking about being asked to assemble?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We are talking about the order of two-and-a-half thousand people. We have broadcast a message with the help of the BBC on our emergency system to pass the Iraqi message to the community.

QUESTION:

What is your advice to those people, Mr. Waldegrave?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

The advice the ambassador in Kuwait has broadcast to them makes it clear that though we hope this will not happen, they should come prepared with some minimum stocks of movable food and other

MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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kit, but they should be prepared to supplement the food at the hotel if that is where they stay for some time but to have some minimum kit with them if they go elsewhere.

QUESTION:

Not cooperate? Not resist the order?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

There is a clear threat in the Iraqi message that there will be trouble for people if they do not assemble there.

QUESTION;

....Iraqi instruction?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We will give it to you shortly.

QUESTION:

There is a discrepancy in your figures of 2,500; the figure of 4,000 was mentioned before.

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I am sorry! 4,000.

QUESTION:

Do you assume they will be sent eventually to Baghdad or to Iraq?



MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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MR. WALDEGRAVE:

What we fear is that they will be interned somewhere; I should think most likely in Iraq somewhere. I have no proof of that and part of the purpose of raising this so swiftly is to try to deter even at this last stage such a policy from taking place.

QUESTION:

If they carry out their threat to round these people up, what action will we take other than protest?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We will be considering that over the next few hours.

QUESTION:

Did this come out of the blue or was there any thought that it might happen connected with the decision to move people out to Baghdad?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It came out of the blue - there was no connection.

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL):

Are you raising this at the United Nations?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We are raising it with the United Nations; we are raising it in every relevant fora; we are raising it with our colleagues

MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE - PRESS BRIEFING - LONDON - 16 AUGUST 1990

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in the EEC, with our allies and with other countries whose nationals may be affected.

QUESTION:

....convoy that is supposed to be leaving today has left?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It left - it has not arrived.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)

\*\* TOTAL PAGE.008 \*\*



071-828 1884

9 BUCKINGHAM GATE

LONDON SW1E 6JP

The Rt. Hon. William Waldegrave MP,  
Minister of State for Foreign &  
Commonwealth Affairs,  
Downing Street,  
London,  
SW1.

*hnd.*  
*D*  
16 August 1990

*Dear William*  
*will request*  
*will be required*

We spoke on the telephone this morning about the telegram which was sent yesterday to UKMIS, New York (Tel No. 441). The telegram referred to our legal justification for naval interception, and contained the sentence:

"We have known all along that our legal justification is sketchy in the absence of a Security Council Resolution authorising enforcement action of that kind."

I was glad to learn from you that you had already taken steps to secure the withdrawal of that passage.

I have advised my colleagues that the United Kingdom is entitled to take measures including the use of force to secure the enforcement of a trade embargo, in response to a request from the legitimate government of Kuwait issued in reliance upon the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. I have never expressed the view that our legal justification is sketchy. It is not.

I know you share my view that, in these circumstances, special care must be taken not to disseminate even in draft communications anything that conveys any lack of confidence in the legality of the steps we are taking in defence of Kuwait under Article 51 of the UN Charter.





071-828 1884

9 BUCKINGHAM GATE  
LONDON SW1E 6JP

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd,  
Cecil Parkinson, John Wakeham, Tom King and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours ever,*

*Kiddy*

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cc/oc

Ref. A090/2025

Prime Minister 2.

MR MORRIS

To see.  
JrGulf Situation: Handling Arrangements

The Prime Minister might wish to have, for her return, a note of the present arrangements for handling the Gulf situation.

Standing Daily Arrangements

2. There is a JIC Sit Rep, available by 9.30 am. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room is open at 9.00 am for a relay of the MOD briefing on intelligence, military situation and media. An Ad Hoc Group meets in the Cabinet Office at 11.00 am, under the Chairmanship of a Foreign Office Minister or the Cabinet Office, including FCO, MOD, Treasury/Bank, DTI, Department of Energy, Department of Transport, Home Office and Law Officers' Department, to run through the Sit Rep and co-ordinate action, including handling of the media. The Department of Transport has set up a ~~Sanctions Co-ordination Centre~~ <sup>Embargo Surveillance Centre</sup> which receives intelligence from all sources about movement of civil ships and aircraft in the area and produces a daily assessment of threats to the embargo: the report of this group is also considered at the Cabinet Office 11.00 am meeting.

This is the main source of intelligence →

Other Arrangements

3. The JIC produces further assessments of specific features (eg Iraq's offer to Iran, the position of Jordan) as required.

4. The Prime Minister may wish to hold at least one meeting of OD(G) next week; the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence are due to be in Paris on Tuesday for the WEU meeting but otherwise they and the Secretary of State for Energy and Chief of the Defence Staff are all in the UK next week, although they

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would have to come up to London. I plan to be away from tomorrow, but Mr Appleyard and Mr Reeves will be in the office next week; and Mr Reeves will be available throughout the weekend.

- 5. I attach a chart showing the location of all members of the Cabinet. It will be clear that it would be a major exercise to set up a meeting of the full Cabinet, but it could of course, be done with a little notice if necessary.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

16 August 1990

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|   |                          |                |               |                |               |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| * - members of OD(q)<br>(CDS is available through office) | Mon<br>20 Aug            | Tues<br>21 Aug | Wed<br>22 Aug | Thur<br>23 Aug | Fri<br>24 Aug |
| Lord President  | Australia ←              |                |               |                |               |
| Lord Chancellor   | Scotland ←               |                |               |                |               |
| Foreign Secretary *                                       | Devon                    | Paris          | Devon ←       |                |               |
| Chancellor of the Exchequer                               | Spain ←                  |                |               |                |               |
| Home Secretary  | Scotland ←               |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Defence *   | Scotland or<br>Wiltshire | Paris          | Wiltshire ←   |                |               |
| Chancellor of the Duchy                                   | France ←                 |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Health  | Yugoslavia ←             |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Education   | Italy ←                  |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Scotland  | Scotland ←               |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Transport   | Bahamas ←                |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Energy *  | Hampshire                | ✓              | ✓             | Wales          |               |
| Lord Privy Seal   | Woodbridge ←             |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Social Services                                       | Essex ←                  |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Environment   | Italy ←                  |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Northern Ireland                                      | In office or             | Wiltshire ←    |               |                |               |
| Min Agriculture   | Suffolk ←                |                |               |                |               |
| Chief Secretary   | ✓                        | ✓              | ✓             | ✓              | ✓             |
| SS/ Employment  | France ←                 |                |               |                |               |
| SS/ Wales   | Wirral                   | ✓              | Wirral        | Suffolk ←      |               |
| SS/ Trade & Industry                                      | ✓                        | ✓              | ✓             | ✓?             | ✓?            |



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COMMENT:

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 160100Z FCO  
TELNO 1936

OF 152310Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW *later today*.  
INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MODUK, BONN *I have asked*  
INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ACTOR *FCO to get earlier possible read-out from the meeting*

YOUR TELNO 1419 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN  
MODUK FOR DUS(P)

SUMMARY

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH STATE AND NSC WHO UNDERTOOK TO PASS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. US SEE ISSUES AND POLICY IN LARGELY SIMILAR TERMS TO OURSELVES. ACUTELY ALIVE TO ISRAELI DIMENSION AND WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH TEL AVIV. WILL BE FORMULATING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON AQABA OVER NEXT 48 HOURS. INTEND TO TAKE A FIRM LINE ON SANCTIONS, WITH ANY HELP TO KING HUSSEIN CONDITIONAL ON EFFECTIVE JORDANIAN ACTION FIRST. PREPARING AGAINST A POSSIBLE NEED TO COUNTER A PEACE PLAN WHICH HUSSEIN MAY FLOAT. SWIFT READ OUT ON HUSSEIN'S VISIT PROMISED.

DETAIL

2. WE TOOK ACTION ON YOUR TUR ON 15 AUGUST, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO SCOWCROFT'S REQUEST FOR A BRITISH INPUT. I GAVE THE GIST TO KIMMITT: AND TOOK COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST, STATE) THROUGH THE DETAILS, LEAVING BEHIND A PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR. COUNSELLOR (POL/MIL) TOOK ACTION IN PARALLEL WITH WELCH (NSC).

3. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE EXPLORING WITH THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN IF THE LATTER'S SCHEDULE COULD ACCOMMODATE A STOPOVER IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON (THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST CALLED TO SAY THAT THE KING WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK HIS JOURNEY IN LONDON - SEE MIFT NOT TO ALL). COVEY TOOK NOTE, AND PROMISED AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE KING WENT ON TO LONDON.

*This at the Ambassador's suggestion.*

4. COVEY CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SANCTIONS-BUSTING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AT AQABA. THE US HAD WORKED ASSIDUOUSLY WITH TEL AVIV TO MAKE CLEAR THAT A LOW ISRAELI PROFILE WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. SO FAR, THE ISRAELIS HAD RESPONDED WELL. INDEED, SHAMIR HAD POINTED OUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS AS EVIDENCE OF FULL ISRAELI COOPERATION AND NOT JUST GRUDGING ACQUIESCENCE. BUT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM.

5. COVEY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WRESTLING WITH THE AQABA PROBLEM. IT WAS EASIER TO FRAME INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE GULF THAN OFF AQABA. THEY WOULD TRY TO AVOID TAKING DRAMATIC STEPS UNTIL AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT, BUT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF FRAMING APPROPRIATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRUCIAL. THE AMERICANS WOULD GREATLY PREFER JORDANIAN COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATING THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO. IF THIS HAPPENED, INTERDICTION MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY. THEIR IMPRESSION AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE QUOTE PLODDING ALONG IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION UNQUOTE, BUT FACED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THESE



INCLUDED PRIOR CONTRACTS, A CONTINUING NEED FOR IRAQI (OR SUBSTITUTE) OIL AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES. THE KING WOULD BE LOOKING FOR GUARANTEES OF RELIEF IN CERTAIN AREAS (PARTICULARLY OIL) BEFORE JORDAN COULD FULLY COMPLY. THE US WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO, BUT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENTS. JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO EARN ITS RELIEF.

6. COVEY THOUGHT THAT THE KING WOULD INDICATE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, BUT WOULD TRY TO BRUSH THIS QUESTION ASIDE. HE WOULD WISH MAINLY TO FOCUS ON JUSTIFICATION OF HIS OWN ACTIONS. HE STILL SEEMED BITTER THAT HIS EFFORTS TO AVERT THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE SO LITTLE SUPPORTED BY EGYPT AND THE SAUDIS. COVEY SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM. IF SO, HE WAS KEEPING IT VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST: THE US AMBASSADOR HAD ACCOMPANIED HUSSEIN AND THE COURT ON HIS AIRCRAFT, AND THERE HAD NOT BEEN A WHISPER OF ANY IRAQI MESSAGE. THE KING MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WOULD BE THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO CLOSE ANY HOLES IN THE SANCTIONS NET. WHEN THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM WAS IN PLACE, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE THE LEVERAGE TO CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES. THE US WOULD THEREFORE NOT REBUFF THE KING, BUT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE GOT THE SEQUENCE RIGHT.

7. A SIMILAR LINE WAS TAKEN BY WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC. HE SAID THAT THE POINTS IN TUR WERE TIMELY AND WELCOME. SCOWCROFT HAD ALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH POWELL THAT OUR VIEWS SHOULD BE INSERTED FIRMLY INTO THE BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN.

8. WELCH EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO BRING HUSSEIN FULLY UP TO THE MARK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE BLOCKADE. LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, SEEMED TO BE GETTING THROUGH AQABA AT PRESENT (AND THE RUSSIAN ARMS SHIPMENT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO AN IRAQI VESSEL AS OPPOSED TO BEING GRANTED LANDING RIGHTS AND TRANSPORTED ACROSS JORDAN). HUSSEIN WOULD NEED HELP IF HE WERE TO DO ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY AND KEEP IT UP (THE NSC ESTIMATED THAT HE STOOD TO LOSE DOLLARS 900 MILLION OR 25 PER CENT OF GNP PER YEAR). BUT HELP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR COOPERATION WITH THE SANCTIONS EFFORT AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE BY NAVAL MEANS IF NECESSARY.

9. AS REGARDS JORDANIAN OBJECTIVES, WELCH SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR IN HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUSH. HE HAD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD BEEN A QUOTE GOOD ONE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE WANTED TO COME AND TALK PERSONALLY. HUSSEIN HAD ADDED QUOTE SANCTIONS ARE VERY IMPORTANT BUT NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AND REALLY NOT WHAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS SPECULATED THAT IN ADDITION TO ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY JORDANIAN POLICY, HUSSEIN WOULD PUT FORWARD A PLAN, EITHER OF SADDAM'S OR HIS OWN. THE NSC HAD JUST HEARD FROM A NOT NECESSARILY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND AMERICAN/WESTERN FORCES FROM THE REGION, ACCOMPANIED BY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND A REPLACEMENT OF EXTERNAL TROOPS BY AN ARAB PEACE KEEPING FORCE. IF HUSSEIN PROPOSED THIS, HE WOULD BE TOLD THAT NO PLAN COULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH IMPLIED THAT IRAQI AND AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE, WHICH FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT OR WHICH ALLOWED SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED PREMATURELY. THE US COULD NOT SET ITS FACE IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT, BUT ANY SUCH PLAN HAD TO BE COMPREHENSIVE, AND WITH THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE RIGHT ORDER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN SADDAM'S DUPLICITY.

10. STATE AND THE NSC CONFIRMED THAT, AS AT NOON LOCAL TIME, HUSSEIN HAD NO APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON TODAY (15 AUGUST) BEFORE THE MEETINGS IN KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST.

*Pacy's assessment  
this is probably over-optimistic*



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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1933

OF 152108Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, AMMAN, ANKARA, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, ACTOR

*Prime Minister**Background for the**proposed telephone**conversation with**Sheikh Sabah.*

ADVANCE COPY

US/KUWAIT: SHAIKH SABAH IN WASHINGTON  
SUMMARY

1. SHAIKH SABAH CALLS ON BUSH, BAKER AND CHENEY TO EXPRESS KUWAITI GRATITUDE. US TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE KUWAITIS TO MAINTAIN HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE AND TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES BEARING THE BRUNT OF UN SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 15 AUGUST, I ASKED ABOUT SHAIKH SABAH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. COVEY SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER AND WOULD SEE CHENEY TODAY (THE LATTER AS A COURTESY AND TO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR US SUPPORT). SABAH HAD NOT HIMSELF HAD MUCH OF SUBSTANCE TO RAISE WITH THE AMERICANS, BUT THE VISIT HAD GIVEN THE KUWAITIS SOME VISIBILITY AND OFFERED THE AMERICANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ACROSS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A - THE KUWAITIS SHOULD MAINTAIN A HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE. THEY SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE STILL A GOVERNMENT AND HAD BOTH FRIENDS AND RESOURCES.

B - THE US WOULD OFFER ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO CONDUCT A PROGRAMME OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. THEY HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED THAT THE KUWAITIS APPOINT AN APPROPRIATE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, WHO SPOKE ENGLISH AND COULD HANDLE THE PRESS. COVEY NOTED THAT THE KUWAITIS NEEDED TECHNICAL ADVICE IN THIS AREA. THEY DID NOT KNOW QUITE HOW TO PROCEED. BUT THEY WERE MAKING EFFORTS: THEY HAD OPENED A QUOTE RESISTANCE RADIO STATION UNQUOTE IN CAIRO, WHICH THE US WOULD HELP SUPPORT.

C - THE KUWAITIS MIGHT ALSO THINK ABOUT SUPPORT FOR COUNTRIES WHO WOULD BEAR THE BRUNT OF UN SANCTIONS. CHIEF AMONG THESE WAS JORDAN, ALTHOUGH PERSUADING THE KUWAITIS TO ASSIST HERE WOULD NOT BE EASY. THEY HAD GIVEN JORDAN ECONOMIC HELP FOR YEARS AND FELT BETRAYED. COVEY THOUGHT THAT GIVEN QUOTE WELL-FRAMED ADVICE

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UNQUOTE FROM THE US AND UK, THEY WOULD AGREE TO CONTRIBUTE. BUT KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN TO BE IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS EFFECTIVELY. AFTER JORDAN WOULD COME TURKEY, FOLLOWED BY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS LIKE EGYPT, MOROCCO AND EVEN SYRIA (COVEY COMMENTED ON THE IRONY HERE: SYRIA WAS STILL ON THE US TERRORIST LIST, BUT THE US WERE LOBBYING ON THEIR BEHALF FOR KUWAITI ASSISTANCE).

3. COVEY NOTED THAT KUWAITI SUPPORT FOR JORDAN DID NOT HAVE TO BE PUBLIC. INDEED, THE MORE DISCREET, THE BETTER. THE KUWAITIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN GENEROUS, BUT THEY NEEDED NOW TO BE PURPOSEFUL AND TO FOCUS THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. THE US WERE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE AND REINFORCE THIS PROCESS.

MEYER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

36

ADVANCE

36

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PS  
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE  
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MR TOMKYS  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR GOULDEN  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NAD  
HD/EED  
HD/SOVIET D  
HD/SED  
HD/UND  
HD/ACDD  
HD/CONSULAR D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D  
HD/AMD  
HD/ECD(E)  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

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UNCLASSIFIED

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MDHIAN 3212

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FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 150800Z FCO

TELNO 1828

OF 150115Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, RIYADH

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, ACTOR

*Prime Minister**There are the only 2 telegrams  
in about US stance at forthcoming  
meeting with King Hussein.**Jm**15/8*

## BUSH PRESS CONFERENCE

## SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A 40 MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON DEVOTED ROUGHLY EQUALLY TO US BUDGET MATTERS (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY) AND IRAQ/KUWAIT.

## DETAIL (IRAQ/KUWAIT)

2. THE PRESIDENT COVERED A LOT OF FAMILIAR GROUND. BUT HE WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY ON JORDANIAN OBSERVANCE OF THE UN SANCTIONS AND ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. THE PRESIDENT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN: HE SAID QUOTE I OUGHT TO LET KING HUSSEIN TELL ME WHAT IS HAPPENING. IF A COUNTRY IS PERMITTING A FLOW OF COMMERCE, IT WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE SANCTIONS. HE IS COMING HERE AND I WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK TO HIM AND EXPLAIN US VIEWS. UNQUOTE. BUT THE PRESIDENT ADDED, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT STOPPING SHIPS GOING INTO AQABA, QUOTE IF IT'S A HOLE THROUGH WHICH COMMERCE FLOWS IN AN OTHERWISE TIGHT NET, I WOULD CERTAINLY THINK THAT AQABA SHOULD BE CLOSED TO IRAQI COMMERCE. UNQUOTE. ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JORDAN (AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION) ECONOMICALLY, BUSH SAID QUOTE I THINK WE WOULD, PROVIDED JORDAN JOINED THESE OTHER COUNTRIES IN FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SANCTIONS. UNQUOTE.

3. COMMENTING ON THE POLICY OF INTERDICTION THE PRESIDENT SAID QUOTE WE ARE ACTING WITHIN OUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND I THINK THE WORLD WANTS TO SEE THESE CHAPTER (SIC) 51 SANCTIONS CARRIED OUT AND THAT IS THE ROLE THE US IS TRYING TO DO ... WE ARE DOING IT THE WAY OUR ATTORNEYS AND OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD RECOMMEND, AND I THINK WE ARE DOING IT PROPERLY, AND I HOPE WE ARE DOING IT TO THE DEGREE THAT ALL SHIPS WILL TURN BACK IF THEY ARE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN ACTION. UNQUOTE.

4. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE FOR THE UN OR FOR A UN JOINT COMMAND. HE SAID: QUOTE THAT IS NOT THE PLAN RIGHT NOW, BUT WE ARE TALKING TO SEE HOW WE CAN MAKE THIS NAVAL PRESENCE MOST EFFECTIVE. BUT THAT (A UN

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COMMAND) IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE.  
REFERRING TO SOVIET IDEAS ABOUT ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN  
RESOLUTIONS HE ADDED QUOTE I DO NOT THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT  
YOU HAVE A UN FLAG IN ORDER FOR COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR  
RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT I WOULD BE SOMEWHAT OPEN MINDED TO TALK  
FURTHER ALONG THOSE LINES. UNQUOTE. (SEE MY TELNO 1928, NOT TO  
ALL).

5. THE PRESIDENT RULED OUT SADDAM'S QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE  
PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION: QUOTE NO. I DO NOT SEE  
ENOUGH POSLTIVE ELEMENTS THERE TO THINK THAT THAT WOULD BE A  
BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATION AT ALL. IT WAS BRINGING IN EXTRANEIOUS  
PROBLEMS, AND IT DID NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE FUNDAMENTAL  
PROBLEM, WHICH IS THAT THEY HAVE GOT TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT AND  
THEY HAVE GOT TO LET THE RIGHTFUL RULERS RETURN TO KUWAIT. SO I  
DO NOT SEE THAT AS A POSSIBILITY TO NEGOTIATION FROM THOSE  
PROPOSALS AT ALL. UNQUOTE.

6. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF IRAQ/KUWAIT SECTIONS BY FAX TO FCO  
EMERGENCY UNIT.

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US/JORDAN: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN

## SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN TO VISIT US FOR MEETINGS WITH BUSH AND BAKER. ADMINISTRATION RECOGNISE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES FACING JORDAN AND ARE PREPARED TO HELP. IMPORTANT TO AVOID FURTHER DESTABILISATION. BUT THE KING MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING US SANCTIONS.

## DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 14 AUGUST, HE CONFIRMED THE CNN STORY THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON. BUSH HAD TELEPHONED HUSSEIN ON 13 AUGUST AND THE KING HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN VISITING. BUSH HAD AGREED AND THE KING WOULD NOW SEE BAKER IN WASHINGTON ON 15 AUGUST, TRAVELLING ON TO KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST TO SPEND A DAY WITH BUSH.

3. AS BACKGROUND, MACK SAID THAT THE NEW US AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN HAD PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS ON 14 AUGUST AND INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. THE KING'S INTEMPERATE SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT - WIDELY INTERPRETED BY THE AMERICAN MEDIA AS A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE US - HAD NOT CHANGED ADMINISTRATION VIEWS. THEY RECOGNISED THAT THE KING WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND DID NOT WISH QUOTE TO PULL THE PLUG ON HIM UNQUOTE. BUT MACK SAID THAT WHILE THE US WOULD TAKE AS SYMPATHETIC AN APPROACH AS POSSIBLE, THEY WOULD BE BLUNT ON A COUPLE OF POINTS:

A) THEY WOULD WISH TO LAY DOWN VERY FIRM CRITERIA FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS BY JORDAN. THE CLEAR MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE THAT IMPLEMENTATION MATTERED. BUT THE US RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD PLACE A TREMENDOUS BURDEN ON JORDAN'S ECONOMY, GREATER THAN ON ANY OTHER STATE. THEY WERE THEREFORE DISPOSED TO FIND WAYS TO HELP. THEY WERE ENCOURAGED THAT THE EC WERE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY COULD DO. THE US MIGHT GO TO THE SAUDIS, WHILE CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE A SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE. JORDAN NEEDED OIL TO REPLACE IRAQI SUPPLIES, AND THE SAUDIS WERE AN OBVIOUS SOURCE. BUT THE KING

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WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS.

B) PREVENTING LEAKAGE THROUGH AQABA WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF JORDANIAN SERIOUSNESS. MACK SAID THAT QUOTE IT WOULD BE A SHAME UNQUOTE IF HUSSEIN DID NOT CONTROL AQABA. IF HE DID NOT, THE US WOULD HAVE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO.

C) THE US WOULD ALSO WARN STRONGLY AGAINST QUOTE MONEY LAUNDERING FOR THE IRAQIS UNQUOTE.

4. MACK SAID THE US FULLY SHARED UK CONCERNS ABOUT PREVENTING THE DESTABILISATION OF JORDAN. THIS WOULD BE A DISASTER ON TWO COUNTS: FIRSTLY, IT WOULD ONLY GIVE THE IRAQIS (AND THE SYRIANS) MORE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION: AND SECONDLY, IT COULD INVITE ISRAELI INTERVENTION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID THIS. MACK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SO FAR THE ISRAELIS HAD ACTED WITH COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 August 1990

*Dear Jane,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO *file*

Your letter of 11 August to Elizabeth Wilmshurst regrettably failed to reach us until well after the Attorney-General's advice conveyed in Elizabeth Wilmshurst's reply of 13 August.

Mr Waldegrave spoke to the Attorney General about these matters on the telephone today. He has asked me to say that he hopes that no options will be ruled out at this stage, provided that they are consistent with our basic legal justification for the RN enforcement of the embargo. The aim must be to achieve the most effective enforcement while maintaining the broadest international support for what we shall be doing. There may well be circumstances in which both of these aims would be furthered by our having Flag State consent, though we would not of course want a situation where we had to seek it in every case. I gather that these aspects are already under consideration amongst the lawyers in the context of the draft RoE.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Sonia Phippard.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Dominic Asquith*

Dominic Asquith  
PS/Mr Waldegrave

Miss J R Binstead  
PS/Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

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*Seen by DM  
Faxed to PM 15.8.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*CCPC*

15 August 1990

*Dear Sir*

## IRAN/IRAQ: PEACE AGREEMENT

You asked for a preliminary assessment of the implications of the announcement today by President Saddam Hussein that Iraq has agreed on the terms of a peace settlement with Iran. I attach Baghdad telno 803 which summarises Saddam's broadcast.

The agreement effectively addresses all the main problems outstanding between Iran and Iraq, ie Iraqi occupation of Iranian territory, sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab and repatriation of prisoners of war. Saddam has conceded on all three points. Eight years of conflict with Iran have produced no net benefit for Iraq.

One issue not covered in Saddam's public announcement was non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This was an important part of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Iranian violation of it was used by Saddam as the principal pretext by Iraq for the 1980 invasion. It no doubt forms part of the agreement. It has no doubt been dealt with in the agreement.

There has been a noticeable warming of the public atmosphere between Iran and Iraq over the past 3-4 months. Bilateral discussions have been taking place, but we were not aware they had reached their final stages. There have, however, been some indications of Iranian connivance in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It seems possible from today's announcement that the peace agreement was cooked up before the invasion, and that the deal may have involved Iran agreeing to stand aside militarily in return for Iraq accepting a peace settlement wholly on Iran's terms.

The main question is whether Iran will agree to allow goods to be imported for Iraq through Iranian ports

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in breach of SCR 661. We have no evidence either way on this point. As far as we know, the Iranians have said nothing publicly about sanctions. The temptations will be considerable, despite Iran's wish to exploit the present situation to mend its fences with the West. Sanctions-busting would have clear implications for UK/Iran relations (on which we shall be commenting separately). We can expect the Americans to be exploring the potential in this changed situation for moving closer to Iran. Iran is likely to remain wary of the Soviet Union. A peace settlement - broadly meeting the objectives of SCR 598 - is likely to remove any remaining inhibitions on arms sales to Iran by eg France and Italy.

It is difficult to see how Saddam Hussein could now climb down over Kuwait in a way which would meet SCR 660. It is the only international "success" he can point to at home. He will be more determined than ever to sit it out. As mentioned above, sanctions leakage through Iran could prove crucial. Meanwhile Saddam Hussein is at least likely to enjoy rhetorical support from Iran over both Israel and the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf.

The Secretary-General will no doubt report in due course to the Security Council on the extent to which SCR 598 has been implemented.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Dominic Asquith*

Dominic Asquith  
PS/Mr Waldegrave

Dominic Morris Esq  
No.10 Downing Street

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IRAN/IRAQ: PEACE AGREEMENT

SUMMARY

1. IRAQ AND IRAN AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE IRAN/IRZQ BORDER STARTING FROM 17 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. IRAQ RADIO BROADCAST AT 1100 LOCAL ON 15 AUGUST THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI DATED 14 AUGUST IN WHICH HE SAID (AS HEARD BY US) THAT, FOLLOWING DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AND THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEGINNING WITH THAT OF 24 APRIL FROM SADDAM TO RAFSANJANI, IRAQ NOW WISHED TO REMOVE ALL OBSTACLES TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD ALSO ALLOW IRAQ TO CONFRONT PROVOCATIONS IN THE REGION AND TO FACE FOREIGN AGGRESSION.

3. SADDAM THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) IRAQ AGREED TO THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN A LETTER OF 8 AUGUST SENT FROM RAFSANJANI VIA THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA TO SADDAM. THESE CALLED FOR A SETTLEMENT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE SHATT AL-ARAB WOULD BE DIVIDED ON THE BASIS OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT. PARTICULAR ATTENTION WOULD ALSO BE DEVOTED TO ARTICLES (DELAING WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION RESPECTIVELY) 6 AND 7 OF UNSCR 598 .

(B) DELEGATIONS FROM EACH SIDE WOULD VISIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF (A) ABOVE AND ON THE CONTENTS OF A LETTER SADDAM HAD SENT TO RAFSANJANI ON 30 JULY (NO FURTHER DETAILS GIVEN).

(C) IRAQI TROOPS WOULD BEGIN TO WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY ON 17 AUGUST LEAVING ONLY A 'SYMBOLIC' NUMBER OF TROOPS AND BORDER GUARDS IN PLACE.

(D) THERE WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE AND COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN IRAQ AND IRAN. IRAQ WOULD REPATRIATE THE FIRST BATCH OF IRANIAN POWS ON 17 AUGUST.

4. SADDAM CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED TO EVERYTHING RAFSANJANI HAD WANTED SO AS TO ALLOW IRAQ TO CONFRONT THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE REGION WITHOUT HINDRANCE.

COMMENT

5. ONCE IRAQ HAD SEIZED KUWAIT, THE SHATT AL-ARAB BECAME OF MINOR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO IRAQ. AND ONCE SADDAM WAS FACED WITH A SERIOUS CHALLENGE ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEIZURE, HIS PRAGMATISM MADE AGREEMENT WITH IRAN ONE COULD EASILY SEE HIM GOING FOR. HOWEVER SADDAM COULD STILL, GIVEN HIS EARLIER POSITION ON THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT, AND THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE RECOVERY HAS SINCE ACQUIRED FACE DIFFICULTIES DOMESTICALLY OVER THIS VOLTE-FACE. SADDAM'S LETTER IS ALSO FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT HE INTENDS NO WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT: INDEED, FOR IRAQ TO WITHDRAW NOW WOULD LEAVE IT A NET LOSER. ✓

6. AS SADDAM MAKES REFERENCE TO A LETTER OF 30 JULY TO RAFSANJANI, THE IRANIANS MAY CONCEIVABLY HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE OF IRAQI PLANS BEFORE THE INVASION.

7. NO SPECIFIC MENTION WAS MADE IN THE LETTER OF THE FUTURE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL OR OF THE SECURITY-COUNCIL IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

8. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR US IS THAT ENFORCING SANCTIONS WILL PROBABLY BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT.

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.IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

MR GORE-BOOTH

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*Prime Minister**Background for the**proposed telephone**conversation with**Sheikh Sabah.*

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INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, ACTOR

*H-H,**Quill's**Report**u.s.**Saudi**Moh'd**Other people*US/KUWAIT: SHAIKH SABAH IN WASHINGTON  
SUMMARY

1. SHAIKH SABAH CALLS ON BUSH, BAKER AND CHENEY TO EXPRESS KUWAITI GRATITUDE. US TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE KUWAITIS TO MAINTAIN HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE AND TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES BEARING THE BRUNT OF UN SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 15 AUGUST, I ASKED ABOUT SHAIKH SABAH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. COVEY SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER AND WOULD SEE CHENEY TODAY (THE LATTER AS A COURTESY AND TO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR US SUPPORT).

SABAH HAD NOT HIMSELF HAD MUCH OF SUBSTANCE TO RAISE WITH THE AMERICANS, BUT THE VISIT HAD GIVEN THE KUWAITIS

SOME VISIBILITY AND OFFERED THE AMERICANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ACROSS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A - THE KUWAITIS SHOULD MAINTAIN A HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE. THEY SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE STILL A GOVERNMENT AND HAD BOTH FRIENDS AND RESOURCES.

B - THE US WOULD OFFER ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO CONDUCT A PROGRAMME OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. THEY HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED THAT THE KUWAITIS APPOINT AN APPROPRIATE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, WHO SPOKE ENGLISH AND COULD HANDLE THE PRESS. COVEY NOTED THAT THE KUWAITIS NEEDED TECHNICAL ADVICE IN THIS AREA. THEY DID NOT KNOW QUITE HOW TO PROCEED. BUT THEY WERE MAKING EFFORTS: THEY HAD OPENED A QUOTE RESISTANCE RADIO STATION UNQUOTE IN CAIRO, WHICH THE US WOULD HELP SUPPORT.

C - THE KUWAITIS MIGHT ALSO THINK ABOUT SUPPORT FOR COUNTRIES WHO WOULD BEAR THE BRUNT OF UN SANCTIONS. CHIEF AMONG THESE WAS JORDAN, ALTHOUGH PERSUADING THE KUWAITIS TO ASSIST HERE WOULD NOT BE EASY. THEY HAD GIVEN JORDAN ECONOMIC HELP FOR YEARS AND FELT BETRAYED. COVEY THOUGHT THAT GIVEN QUOTE WELL-FRAMED ADVICE

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UNQUOTE FROM THE US AND UK, THEY WOULD AGREE TO CONTRIBUTE.  
BUT KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN TO BE IMPLEMENTING  
SANCTIONS EFFECTIVELY. AFTER JORDAN WOULD COME TURKEY,  
FOLLOWED BY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS LIKE EGYPT, MOROCCO AND  
EVEN SYRIA (COVEY COMMENTED ON THE IRONY HERE: SYRIA WAS  
STILL ON THE US TERRORIST LIST, BUT THE US WERE LOBBYING  
ON THEIR BEHALF FOR KUWAITI ASSISTANCE).

3. COVEY NOTED THAT KUWAITI SUPPORT FOR JORDAN DID NOT HAVE  
TO BE PUBLIC. INDEED, THE MORE DISCREET, THE BETTER. THE  
KUWAITIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN GENEROUS, BUT THEY NEEDED NOW TO BE  
PURPOSEFUL AND TO FOCUS THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND FINANCIAL  
RESOURCES. THE US WERE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE AND REINFORCE  
THIS PROCESS.

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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
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*From the Private Secretary*

15 August 1990

The Prime Minister has seen the unnumbered telegram of 14 August from BDS Washington on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. She has noted that the Saudis would welcome "a battalion of British ground and special forces and to assist with behind the lines activities". She has commented that we need to treat that rather cautiously.

DOMINIC MORRIS

Miss Jane Binstead,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



General enquiries 071-828 7155  
Direct line 071-828-1386

17 cc/c

THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS  
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE  
LONDON SW1E 6JP

SECRET UK EYES A

Miss J R Binstead  
P.S.  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1

20/8/90

15 August 1990

Dear Ms Binstead

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO.

File with DM

I refer to your letter of 14 August to Charles Powell, which contains the RoE profile for naval enforcement of the trade embargo in the Gulf.

The Attorney General is content with the RoE.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Dominic Asquith and Sonia Phippard.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

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Prime Minister

There are the only 2 telegrams  
 in about US stance at forthcoming  
 meeting with King Hussein.

ans Jm

15/8

## BUSH PRESS CONFERENCE

## SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A 40 MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON DEVOTED ROUGHLY EQUALLY TO US BUDGET MATTERS (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY) AND IRAQ/KUWAIT. DETAIL (IRAQ/KUWAIT)
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6. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF IRAQ/KUWAIT SECTIONS BY FAX TO FCO  
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FM WASHINGTON  
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TELNO 1930  
OF 150120Z AUGUST 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, ACTOR

ms

US/JORDAN: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN

## SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN TO VISIT US FOR MEETINGS WITH BUSH AND BAKER. ADMINISTRATION RECOGNISE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES FACING JORDAN AND ARE PREPARED TO HELP. IMPORTANT TO AVOID FURTHER DESTABILISATION. BUT THE KING MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING US SANCTIONS.

## DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 14 AUGUST, HE CONFIRMED THE CNN STORY THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON. BUSH HAD TELEPHONED HUSSEIN ON 13 AUGUST AND THE KING HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN VISITING. BUSH HAD AGREED AND THE KING WOULD NOW SEE BAKER IN WASHINGTON ON 15 AUGUST, TRAVELLING ON TO KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST TO SPEND A DAY WITH BUSH.

3. AS BACKGROUND, MACK SAID THAT THE NEW US AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN HAD PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS ON 14 AUGUST AND INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. THE KING'S INTEMPERATE SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT - WIDELY INTERPRETED BY THE AMERICAN MEDIA AS A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE US - HAD NOT CHANGED ADMINISTRATION VIEWS. THEY RECOGNISED THAT THE KING WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND DID NOT WISH QUOTE TO PULL THE PLUG ON HIM UNQUOTE. BUT MACK SAID THAT WHILE THE US WOULD TAKE AS SYMPATHETIC AN APPROACH AS POSSIBLE, THEY WOULD BE BLUNT ON A COUPLE OF POINTS:

A) THEY WOULD WISH TO LAY DOWN VERY FIRM CRITERIA FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS BY JORDAN. THE CLEAR MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE THAT IMPLEMENTATION MATTERED. BUT THE US RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD PLACE A TREMENDOUS BURDEN ON JORDAN'S ECONOMY, GREATER THAN ON ANY OTHER STATE. THEY WERE THEREFORE DISPOSED TO FIND WAYS TO HELP. THEY WERE ENCOURAGED THAT THE EC WERE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY COULD DO. THE US MIGHT GO TO THE SAUDIS, WHILE CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE A SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE. JORDAN NEEDED OIL TO REPLACE IRAQI SUPPLIES, AND THE SAUDIS WERE AN OBVIOUS SOURCE. BUT THE KING

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WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS.

B) PREVENTING LEAKAGE THROUGH AQABA WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF JORDANIAN SERIOUSNESS. MACK SAID THAT QUOTE IT WOULD BE A SHAME UNQUOTE IF HUSSEIN DID NOT CONTROL AQABA. IF HE DID NOT, THE US WOULD HAVE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO.

C) THE US WOULD ALSO WARN STRONGLY AGAINST QUOTE MONEY LAUNDERING FOR THE IRAQIS UNQUOTE.

4. MACK SAID THE US FULLY SHARED UK CONCERNS ABOUT PREVENTING THE DESTABILISATION OF JORDAN. THIS WOULD BE A DISASTER ON TWO COUNTS: FIRSTLY, IT WOULD ONLY GIVE THE IRAQIS (AND THE SYRIANS) MORE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION: AND SECONDLY, IT COULD INVITE ISRAELI INTERVENTION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID THIS. MACK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SO FAR THE ISRAELIS HAD ACTED WITH COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT.

MEYER

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PAGE 2

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SECRET - UK EYES A



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 August 1990

Thank you for your letter of 14 August to Charles Powell with a complete ROE profile for the ARMILLA patrol. The Prime Minister has agreed this subject to three provisos:

- first, that the Attorney General (or Solicitor General) has agreed it;
- second, that the Iranians confirm their agreement to surveillance operations within the IAZ by ARMILLA ships and MPS before any such operations take place within the IAZ;
- third, that the specific agreement of friendly Gulf States should be obtained before enforcement operations are conducted within their territorial waters.

I am sending copies of this letter to Dominic Asquith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Julie Wheldon (Law Officers' Department), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

DOMINIC MORRIS

Miss Jane Binstead,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET - UK EYES A



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister <sup>2</sup>Better than nothing but better still if  
15 August 1990 the World Service

Dear Dominic,

did not make a  
least of it!

IRAQ/KUWAIT

Charles Powell's letter to me of 14 August referred to a BBC  
World Service report.

The report in question (a transcript of which I enclose)  
quotes the impressions of two expatriates that "most of the  
relevant Diplomats were either away on leave or had flown out  
of Kuwait during the early stages of the Iraqi invasion".

Mr Waldegrave spoke in strong terms to David Witherow and to  
John Tusa, pointing out that these impressions were utterly  
fallacious and that before publicising them the BBC should  
have checked with the Foreign Office. He asked that the BBC  
publicly refute the impressions. Mr Tusa agreed that a  
refutation would appear in the 4 pm World Service News Report  
today. This has indeed happened. I attach the transcript of  
the relevant news report. Mr Waldegrave thinks this pretty  
speeding response is tolerable.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robin Butler,  
Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely

Dominic Asquith

Dominic Asquith  
PS/Mr WaldegraveDominic Morris Esq  
10 Downing Street



BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORT AT 1300, 13 AUGUST 1990

"Two women I've interviewed in London ..... are particularly critical of the lack of help available from the British and American embassies in Kuwait. Their impression is that most of the relevant diplomats were either away on leave or had flown out of Kuwait during the early stages of the Iraqi invasion. Escapes have been organised instead by what they call groups of volunteers working with Kuwaitis. "

## BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORT AT 1600, 15 AUGUST

NMP XN49 1524 15/08/90 LINES : T=31 P=26 1533

DESPATCH FROM =LONDON =

BY =JACK THOMPSON =

TAPE NO:238

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=KUWAIT SITUATIONER/DIPLOMATS =  
D. 1745

CUE: The Foreign Office in London says the overall situation in Kuwait appeared to be getting worse. Our foreign affairs correspondent, Jack Thompson, says reports from the British embassy in Kuwait suggest an almost total absence of law and order in the country.

The Foreign Office spokesman said general conditions in Kuwait appeared to be deteriorating. There were reports of wholesale looting - he didn't say who by. Food and petrol were still available but the banks had stayed closed. There'd been no significant improvement in the internal telephone service and no evidence of a civil police force. These reports are based on information supplied by the British embassy in Kuwait which like all others in the country has been told by the Iraqis to move its operations to Baghdad by the twenty-fourth of the month. Britain has twenty-five diplomats and officials in Kuwait. Contrary to impressions gained by some expatriates who've managed to get out of Kuwait, all but three of them were on duty at the time of the Iraqi invasion. The Foreign Office said the embassy had tried to stay in touch with the British community in Kuwait through a system of district wardens but with phone lines down this had not been easy. One of the diplomats is the consul, Mr Larry Banks. The Foreign Office said he'd again been unsuccessful in attempts to find the body of Mr Douglas Croskery, the British businessman shot dead by Iraqi troops as he'd tried to cross into Saudi Arabia at the weekend. The spokesman said that yesterday Mr Banks had been given full co-operation by the Iraqi military who'd provided an escort headed by a lieutenant-colonel to search an area





*Minister*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

*Dear Dominic,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has seen Kuwait telegram no. 371, reporting the slur carried by the BBC World Service. She is incensed by this and hopes that the Foreign Secretary or Mr. Waldegrave will take it up at the highest level with the BBC and insist upon a public apology.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

The Honourable Dominic Asquith,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



0931Z

COMMENT:

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Prime Minister

To see. The British input

is in preparation for the President's meeting with King Hussein

later today.

I have asked

FEO to get earliest possible read-out from the meeting

SECRET

4 WASHINGTON

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ELNO 1936

152310Z AUGUST 90

NFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW

NFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MODUK, BONN

NFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ACTOR

OUR TELNO 1419 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN

MODUK FOR DUS(P)

SUMMARY

ACTION TAKEN WITH STATE AND NSC WHO UNDERTOOK TO PASS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. US SEE ISSUES AND POLICY IN LARGELY SIMILAR TERMS TO OURSELVES. ACUTELY ALIVE TO ISRAELI DIMENSION AND WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH TEL AVIV. WILL BE FORMULATING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON AQABA OVER NEXT 48 HOURS. INTEND TO TAKE A FIRM LINE ON SANCTIONS, WITH ANY HELP TO KING HUSSEIN CONDITIONAL ON EFFECTIVE JORDANIAN ACTION FIRST. PREPARING AGAINST A POSSIBLE NEED TO COUNTER A PEACE PLAN WHICH HUSSEIN MAY FLOAT. SWIFT READ OUT ON HUSSEIN'S VISIT PROMISED.

DETAIL

2. WE TOOK ACTION ON YOUR TUR ON 15 AUGUST, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO SCOWCROFT'S REQUEST FOR A BRITISH INPUT. I GAVE THE GIST TO KIMMITT: AND TOOK COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST, STATE) THROUGH THE DETAILS, LEAVING BEHIND A PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR. COUNSELLOR (POL/MIL) TOOK ACTION IN PARALLEL WITH WELCH (NSC).

3. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE EXPLORING WITH THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN IF THE LATTER'S SCHEDULE COULD ACCOMMODATE A STOPOVER IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON. (THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST CALLED TO SAY THAT THE KING WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK HIS JOURNEY IN LONDON - SEE MIFT NOT TO ALL). COVEY TOOK NOTE, AND PROMISED AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE KING WENT ON TO LONDON.

4. COVEY CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SANCTIONS-BUSTING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AT AQABA. THE US HAD WORKED ASSIDUOUSLY WITH TEL AVIV TO MAKE CLEAR THAT A LOW ISRAELI PROFILE WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. SO FAR, THE ISRAELIS HAD RESPONDED WELL. INDEED, SHAMIR HAD POINTED OUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS AS EVIDENCE OF FULL ISRAELI COOPERATION AND NOT JUST GRUDGING ACQUIESCENCE. BUT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM.

5. COVEY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WRESTLING WITH THE AQABA PROBLEM. IT WAS EASIER TO FRAME INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE GULF THAN OFF AQABA. THEY WOULD TRY TO AVOID TAKING DRAMATIC STEPS UNTIL AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT, BUT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF FRAMING APPROPRIATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRUCIAL. THE AMERICANS WOULD GREATLY PREFER JORDANIAN COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATING THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO. IF THIS HAPPENED, INTERDICTION MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY. THEIR IMPRESSION AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE QUOTE PLODDING ALONG IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION UNQUOTE, BUT FACED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THESE

This is the Jordanian Minister's suggestion.



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IN DEED PRIOR CONTRACTS, A CONTINUING NEED FOR IRAQI (OR SUBSTITUTE) OIL AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES. THE KING WOULD BE LOOKING FOR GUARANTEES OF RELIEF IN CERTAIN AREAS, (PARTICULARLY OIL) BEFORE JORDAN COULD FULLY COMPLY. THE US WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO, BUT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENTS. JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO EARN ITS RELIEF.

6. COVEY THOUGHT THAT THE KING WOULD INDICATE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, BUT WOULD TRY TO BRUSH THIS QUESTION ASIDE. HE WOULD WISH MAINLY TO FOCUS ON JUSTIFICATION OF HIS OWN ACTIONS. HE STILL SEEMED BITTER THAT HIS EFFORTS TO AVERT THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE SO LITTLE SUPPORTED BY EGYPT AND THE SAUDIS. COVEY SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM. IF SO, HE WAS KEEPING IT VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST: THE US AMBASSADOR HAD ACCOMPANIED HUSSEIN AND THE COURT ON HIS AIRCRAFT, AND THERE HAD NOT BEEN A WHISPER OF ANY IRAQI MESSAGE. THE KING MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WOULD BE THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO CLOSE ANY HOLES IN THE SANCTIONS NET. WHEN THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM WAS IN PLACE, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE THE LEVERAGE TO CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES. THE US WOULD THEREFORE NOT REBUFF THE KING, BUT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE GOT THE SEQUENCE RIGHT.

7. A SIMILAR LINE WAS TAKEN BY WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC. HE SAID THAT THE POINTS IN TUR WERE TIMELY AND WELCOME. SCOWCROFT HAD ALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH POWELL THAT OUR VIEWS SHOULD BE INSERTED FIRMLY INTO THE BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN.

8. WELCH EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO BRING HUSSEIN FULLY UP TO THE MARK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE BLOCKADE. LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, SEEMED TO BE GETTING THROUGH AQABA AT PRESENT (AND THE RUSSIAN ARMS SHIPMENT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO AN IRAQI VESSEL AS OPPOSED TO BEING GRANTED LANDING RIGHTS AND TRANSPORTED ACROSS JORDAN). HUSSEIN WOULD NEED HELP IF HE WERE TO DO ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY AND KEEP IT UP (THE NSC ESTIMATED THAT HE STOOD TO LOSE DOLLARS 900 MILLION OR 25 PER CENT OF GNP PER YEAR). BUT HELP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR COOPERATION WITH THE SANCTIONS EFFORT AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE BY NAVAL MEANS IF NECESSARY.

9. AS REGARDS JORDANIAN OBJECTIVES, WELCH SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR IN HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUSH. HE HAD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD BEEN A QUOTE GOOD ONE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE WANTED TO COME AND TALK PERSONALLY. HUSSEIN HAD ADDED QUOTE SANCTIONS ARE VERY IMPORTANT BUT NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AND REALLY NOT WHAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS SPECULATED THAT IN ADDITION TO ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY JORDANIAN POLICY, HUSSEIN WOULD PUT FORWARD A PLAN, EITHER OF SADDAM'S OR HIS OWN. THE NSC HAD JUST HEARD FROM A NOT NECESSARILY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND AMERICAN/WESTERN FORCES FROM THE REGION, ACCOMPANIED BY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND A REPLACEMENT OF EXTERNAL TROOPS BY AN ARAB PEACE KEEPING FORCE. IF HUSSEIN PROPOSED THIS, HE WOULD BE TOLD THAT NO PLAN COULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH IMPLIED THAT IRAQI AND AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE, WHICH FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT OR WHICH ALLOWED SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED PREMATURELY. THE US COULD NOT SET ITS FACE IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT, BUT ANY SUCH PLAN HAD TO BE COMPREHENSIVE, AND WITH THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE RIGHT ORDER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN SADDAM'S DUPLICITY.

10. STATE AND THE NSC CONFIRMED THAT, AS AT NOON LOCAL TIME, HUSSEIN HAD NO APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON TODAY (15 AUGUST) BEFORE THE MEETINGS IN KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST.

*thinks this is  
probably an  
over-estimate*



① 039<sup>a</sup>

15A (a-b)

mf

COMMENT:

SECRET

FM FCO

TO DESKBY 142100Z WASHINGTON

TELNO 1419

OF 142030Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, RIYADH, UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN

## SUMMARY

1. SCOWCROFT/POWELL CONVERSATION ON INTERDICTING SHIPPING AT AQABA. SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD SAY TO HUSSEIN ON ASSISTANCE IF HE IMPLEMENTS SANCTIONS.

## DETAIL

2. POWELL SPOKE TO SCOWCROFT ON 14 AUGUST. HE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE USE OF AQABA TO EVADE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY ACTION YET TO INTERDICT SHIPPING GOING TO OR FROM AQABA. WE SAW THAT MAINLY AS A TASK FOR THE AMERICANS OR OTHER WESTERN NAVIES, SINCE OUR EFFORT WAS MAINLY IN THE ARABIAN GULF. THE WORST OUTCOME WOULD BE IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO TRY TO INTERDICT SUCH SHIPPING. BUT UNTIL SOMETHING WAS DONE, AQABA WOULD REMAIN A MAJOR HOLE IN THE SANCTIONS ARRANGEMENTS. SCOWCROFT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS FULLY SHARED OUR CONCERN. HE HAD JUST COME OFF THE TELEPHONE WITH HUSSEIN WHO HAD ASKED TO COME ACROSS TO THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS AND OTHER PROBLEMS. THE KING HAD NOT GIVEN MUCH INDICATION OF HOW HELPFUL OR OTHERWISE HE WAS GOING TO BE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY A GOOD SIGN THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR A MEETING. SCOWCROFT SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE AMERICANS IF WE COULD LET THEM HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE PUT TO THE KING.

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD MAKE THIS FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE AMERICANS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT SEES THE KING:

- REINFORCEMENT OF POWELL'S REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR WESTERN AND PREFERABLY THE US NAVY TO BLOCK THE HOLE AT AQABA AND THE IMPERATIVE NEED TO STOP THE ISRAELIS GETTING IN ON THIS ACT,
- THE NEED TO GIVE THE KING CLEAR REASSURANCE ABOUT FINANCIAL HELP IF HE IMPLEMENTS UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. OUR THOUGHTS ARE THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT OFFER TO SET UP AND LEAD AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF POTENTIAL DONORS INCLUDING PERHAPS JAPAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT. URGENT CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN IN WHITEHALL TO HOW WE MIGHT HELP IF SUCH A GROUP IS SET UP AND WE HOPE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS SHORTLY,
- THE USEFULNESS TO THE KING OF WHATEVER ASSURANCE THE PRESIDENT CAN GIVE THAT THE US WILL NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, ONCE THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS BEEN RESOLVED,

4. AS BACKGROUND. THE (UK/US EYES) JIC ASSESSMENT ON JORDAN IS ISSUING TONIGHT (14 AUGUST) AND IS BEING TELEGRAPHED TO YOU.

5. POWELL ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST TO SCOWCROFT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID BEING HEAVY-HANDED IN ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS OF WESTERN NAVIES IN THE GULF. THIS SORT



b

(2)

OF COORDINATION FUNCTIONED BEST IF IT WAS DONE AT AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL, WITHOUT A LARGE POLITICAL FLAG STUCK TO IT. GENERAL SCOWCROFT SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF SENSITIVITIES IN THIS AREA AND WAS GLAD TO HAVE THEM DRAWN TO HIS ATTENTION.

HURD

YYYY

MAIN 15

NO DISTRIBUTION

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PS

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

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PS/PUS

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MR TOMKYS

1

MR GOULDEN

1

MR MILES

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HD/NENAD

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EMERGENCY UNIT

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SIR P CRADDOCK

1

CHIEF ASSESSMENT STAFF

1

(GOBLE)

TOTAL P.06

PRIME MINISTER

Tom King's office have been on. He is furious about Alan Clark going to the Gulf, thinks it all wrong and wants to talk to you urgently.

I think it would be a great mistake to change course now. A very large number of people in Whitehall know about the intended visit, a VC10 has been booked and a press announcement prepared. Contact has been made with our embassies in the small Gulf states. We shall look proper charlies if we go into reverse.

Could you please let Monica know what time you would be prepared to speak to Tom King?

Charles Powell

14 August 1990

We spoke about  
this  
not



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PAGE.002

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UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED  
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 TO DESKBY 140730Z FCO  
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 OF 140700Z AUGUST 90  
 INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT

*You will recognize  
 the signature of  
 this.*

# EXFILTRATION FROM KUWAIT

1. VICTOR MALLETT FROM THE FINANCIAL TIMES HAS TELEPHONED TO TELL US THAT HE, ACCOMPANIED BY MIKE TREW, SUCCESSFULLY REACHED RIYADH THIS MORNING, HAVING CROSSED THE BORDER LAST NIGHT.
2. WE SHALL BE DEBRIEFING MALLETT AND TREW (WHO IS AN EX ARMY OFFICER) LATER TODAY, AND SHALL REPORT FURTHER.

MUNRO

YYYY

## DISTRIBUTION

36

## ADVANCE

30 33


IRAQ/KUWAIT  
 PS  
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 PS/PUS  
 MR TOMKYS  
 MR GORE-BOOTH  
 MR FAIRWEATHER  
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 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
 SIR P CRADOCK,  
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
 AUS (C) MODUK  
 HD/SEC (C) (C) MODUK  
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

HD/NEWS D  
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NNNN

EMERGENCY UNIT  
 RESIDENT CLERK



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. 71944/90  
SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



faxed to Party CCPC.

29/8/90

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CAP

Filed on MIDDLE EAST:  
Situation A23

14th August 1990

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London

I wish to thank you for your recent letter and your expressions of concern for Bahrain. The United Kingdom's continued support and assistance to Bahrain is most welcome and deeply appreciated at the current time.

I am aware that the delegations from both our countries are now engaged in talks regarding the current situation, assessing the threat to Bahrain and giving consideration to what steps can be taken to counter any further Iraqi aggression and to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

The positive response of the United Kingdom in the deployment of aircraft in the region and the strengthening of the Armilla patrol is a most valuable contribution to the international effort. The ships of the Armilla patrol are always welcome in Bahrain and the usual facilities will continue to be available to them. I am also able to confirm that Bahrain is willing, during the current crisis, to make facilities available to the RAF to station aircraft in Bahrain both to defend Bahrain and her neighbour, Saudi Arabia, and also to facilitate the international response to the problem. Bahrain is also making arrangements to increase the facilities available to other friendly countries as part of her contribution to the international effort to resolve the current situation. There will, of course, be the need for all parties to coordinate their activities as the events unfold.



بسم الرحمن الرحيم



- 2 -

As you may be aware, my Government has requested the supply of certain military equipment to Bahrain for defensive purposes. I should be grateful if this request can receive urgent and sympathetic consideration.

I would like to thank you again for your confirmation of support for Bahrain and for the response and initiatives taken by the United Kingdom and her allies in trying to resolve the current crisis in this region.

With sincere personal regards,

*Isa bin Sulman*

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa  
Amir of the State of Bahrain

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MDADAN 9303

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

SECRET

FM BDS WASHINGTON

TO FLASH MODUK PE

TELNO U/N

OF 140044Z AUGUST 90

AND TO FLASH FCO LONDON

SECRET

*Prime Minister**I think we need  
to react X a bit**Confidentially**CONF**Yes*

SIC EAO/ZMC/ZOK

FOR DG MKTG, PS/HDES, DG SAP, FROM: HDES

SUBJECT: ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA.

I VISITED HRH PRINCE BANDAR AT THE SAUDI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON EARLIER TODAY. BANDAR WAS IN EXCELLENT FORM AND HIGHLY COMPLIMENTARY AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS CENTRAL ROLE IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN ASPEN AND IN WASHINGTON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN MUSTERING SUPPORT. BANDAR OPENED WITH THE ISSUE OF TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH IS BEING ADDRESSED ELSEWHERE. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED IRAQ INCUSSION AND ANNEXTION OF KUWAIT HAS HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT ON SAUDI DEFENCE THINKING. BANDAR ENVISAGES THE NEED TO BUILD UP DEFENCE FORCES TO 600,000 (HALF RESERVISTS) WITH THE EQUIPMENT, CONSTRUCTION, TRAINING AND SUPPORT THAT THAT IMPLIES. WE CANNOT EXPECT ALWAYS TO LOOK TO OUR FRIENDS TIMES LIKE THESE, HE SAID. THE PROCUREMENT BEING CONTEMPLATED INCLUDES 2000 TANKS, 500-600 HELICOPTERS, FRIGATES AND A MUCH ENHANCED AIR STRIKE CAPABILITY. A FIXED PROPORTION OF SAUDI INCOME WOULD NEED TO BE ALLOCATED FOR THAT PURPOSE. THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUND FORCES IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES HAD BEEN POINTEDLY RE-AFFIRMED. CLEARLY, TIME AND REFLECTION WILL TEMPER SAUDI ASPIRATIONS, HOWEVER EVEN PARTIAL REALISATION WILL CARRY SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR US. THE SAUDIS WOULD WELCOME (QUOTE) A BATTALION OF BRITISH GROUND AND SPECIAL FORCES AND TO ASSIST WITH BEHIND THE LINE ACTIVITIES (UNQUOTE). BRITISH CAPABILITY HERE IS SEEN TO BE THE BEST. BANDAR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING TWO MILLION, REPEAT TWO MILLION NBC SUITS FROM THE UK, US WHEREVER THEY CAN BE FOUND. THE BRITISH HAVE THE BEST, HE SAID (EXCLAM). THEY ARE NEEDED TO INSTIL CONFIDENCE IN THE CIVIL POPULATION. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF DG MKTG COULD FOLLOW UP THIS LAST POINT AND ALSO ENSURE THAT THIS SIGNAL IS APPROPRIATELY COPIES. BANDAR WAS ABOUT TO GIVE BRITISH AND EUROPEAN INTERVIEWS WHEN I LEFT AND INVITED ME BACK TO WASHINGTON BEFORE I RETURN TO THE UK THOUGH IT LOOKS DIFFICULT

PAGE 1

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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE D10  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (C) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN





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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

14th August 1990

Prime Minister

Have they been

Agree Rules of Engagement?

approved by the

A-6 or S-6?

DM

15/8

Dear Charles Provided either agreesthat I approve subject  
to the confirmation at X-ray below etc.

I wrote to you yesterday evening with (inter alia) our proposal for a revised concept of operations for the ARMILLA patrol to include the tasks of monitoring and, if necessary, enforcement of UN sanctions in addition to its existing tasks in support of British shipping and friendly Gulf states. In my letter I said that a complete ROE profile for this concept would be submitted today. The attached profile has been agreed by the COS and by my Secretary of State. The Defence Secretary would be grateful to know that the Prime Minister and other colleagues are content so that appropriate instructions can be issued to the Patrol.

There are three points to which I would draw particular attention. First, the profile permits ARMILLA ships and MPS to conduct surveillance operations (but not interceptions) within the Iranian Advisory Zone (outside Iranian territorial waters). Although the ARMILLA ships already penetrate the IAZ on an occasional basis, it would not be prudent to extend this or to include Nimrod aircraft without the tacit agreement of the Iranians and arrangements have been made to obtain this via their Mission to the UN in New York. Although the initial reaction in New York was relaxed, we will need confirmation before this particular provision can be implemented.

Second, it will not be possible to conduct enforcement operations within the territorial waters of the friendly Gulf states unless their specific agreement has been obtained.

Finally, as foreshadowed in my previous letter, the proposed ROE would extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30' N (just north of Bahrain) to allow the Patrol to provide support to shipping as far as the Saudi ports of Al Jubayl and Ra's Tammurah.

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



1990-08-15 10:05

P.01

SECRET UK EYES A



I am sending copies of this letter and attachment to Dominic Asquith (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)  
Private Secretary

SECRET UK EYES A  
2

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

*Mr Boyce,  
Emergency Unit*

*work is in hand,*

*I believe*

*cc PS/Mr Handberg*

*cc Mr Guckler,*

*RAD*

*DAsgw 14/viii*

14 August 1990

*See Dominic.*

#### IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has again referred to the need for effective counter-propaganda against Iraq. I have explained that the Department are working on putting together material and this needs to be done carefully if it is to have the maximum effect. The Prime Minister hopes very much we can have something ready by the end of the week.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely  
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Reference .....

*Minister**A (Gave) to PM*

From: N J Guckian  
Middle East Section  
Research & Analysis Dept  
OAB 2/65 210 6436

Date: 14 August 1990

Mr Boyce  
Emergency Unit

cc  
→ PS/Mr Waldegrave

EXAMPLES OF IRAQI BRUTALITY, 1968-1990

1 Mr Powell's letter of 13 August 1990 to PS/Mr Waldegrave requested examples of brutality by Saddam Hussain's regime for use by the Prime Minister. The attached is taken from sources ready to hand and is not drawn from any secret sources. In addition to a general introduction, I include specific examples of brutality over the period since the Ba'ath party came to power in 1968. It is far from exhaustive.

2 I include as examples the execution of Farzad Bazoft and the Swede this year, given that they are still very much in the public memory. However, I share David Hope's view that they should not be used by officials because of the complications it may cause in the case of Mr Richter.

N J Guckian

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Page 1

CODE 18-77

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Reference.....

*Minister*

From: N J Guckian  
Middle East Section  
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N J Guckian

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## CONFIDENTIAL

## THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI REGIME UNDER SADDAM HUSSAIN

Introduction

1 The Ba'ath Party seized power in a military coup in July 1968, and has ruled Iraq ever since. Saddam Hussain became Vice President in 1969 and succeeded President Hassan al-Bakr in 1979, though he had been the real power in Iraq since the mid 1970s.

2 Since 1968 the regime has ruled by fear: it is one of the most repressive in the world. The government, with Saddam Hussain at its head, consists of ruthless men who do not hesitate to use violence to suppress any suspicion of opposition. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed or have disappeared over the years, most of whom have gone unreported. Iraqi dissidents and exiles have been hunted down and assassinated abroad. The government has subjected its citizens to forced relocation and deportations, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary and political executions almost as a matter of course.

3 Saddam Hussain has set the tone for the system of murder and repression and has personally killed opponents. He surrounds himself in an aura of terror, and over the years he has progressively killed or edged out all possible rivals. Often, this is done under the veil of revolutionary justice. For example, RCC decree No 6 of November 1986 (which is still in force) prescribes the death penalty for the deliberate and public insult of the President, the RCC, the Ba'ath Party and the National Assembly.

Human Rights Organisations

4 Human Rights Organisations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have consistently condemned Iraq's record. Most recently, in February 1990, the Middle East Watch's report on human rights in Iraq commented as follows:

"Iraq is a well organised police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. ... With the exception of freedom of worship, the Iraqi government denies its citizens all fundamental rights and freedoms and ruthlessly suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent."

5 In February 1989, Amnesty International, in its report entitled: "Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression", highlighted brutality towards children as routine in Iraqi prisons - mainly to make them give information about relations. To quote a short passage:

"At least 30 methods of torture have been used in Iraqi prisons. ... We have received reports of

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Page 1



## CONFIDENTIAL

children having been victims of beatings, whippings, sexual abuse and electric shock treatment. Some young people are reported to have died after torture."

6 A final general example of the Iraqi regime's appalling disregard for human life was the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict, in which over 100,000 Iraqis and over 250,000 Iranians died.

Examples

A) Attempted Assassination of President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959.

Saddam Hussain, at the age of 22, played a prominent role in this abortive attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President. According to David Hirst, in today's Guardian, it was not his first. In his teens he is said to have murdered a shepherd, and before 1959 had committed three more murders.

B) Murder of Nasir Al-Hani, first Foreign Minister after the 1968 Ba'athist coup. In 1968, his body was found riddled with bullets in a ditch outside Baghdad. This was the first of a series of Ba'athist political killings which it was believed was to assure that Saddam Hussain had no rival.

C) Hardan Tikriti, former Ba'athist Defence Minister. In 1971 he was machine gunned down in Kuwait by Iraqi security.

D) 1 July 1973 Attempted Coup, led by the Director of Security, Nazim Kazzar. This was followed by mass executions of Iraqi officers, including Kazzar.

E) Assassination in London on 9 July 1978 of General Abdul Razzak al-Naif, (a former Prime Minister of Iraqi for a short period in 1968). The Iraqi murderer, Salim Hassan, was caught and is currently serving a life sentence for terrorist murder in a British prison.

F) Saddam Hussain becomes President of Iraq: In July 1979, Saddam Hussain replaced President Hassan al-Bakr. In the following purge, some accounts suggest that 500 senior Ba'athists were executed in the first two weeks of his Presidency. The purge was not only directed against dissidents (Kurds, Communists and disaffected Shia), but also against Ba'athists and old associates who might have been a threat to him. The deaths not only occurred via quasi-legal proceedings in the revolutionary courts, but also by the security apparatus who shot victims in the street, including central Baghdad. At least five members of the RCC were murdered, with Saddam insisting that a number of his colleagues on the RCC personally did the killing.

G) Execution of Bakr Sadr, April 1980; Shia religious leader. This was followed by another purge of army officers, with at least twenty being executed.

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H) Destruction of the town of Al Dujayl (40 miles NE of Baghdad):  
In July 1982, an assassination attempt occurred near this village. According to a report in the Economist, Iraqi security's retaliation was swift and brutal. 150 families disappeared, assumed murdered, and the rest of the inhabitants (the village had 2,000 people) were deported, the men were sent north and the women and children to the south. The village was then completely destroyed.

I) Murder of Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum in January 1988:  
Leading Iraqi Shia exile who fled Iraq in 1969, and brother of the leader of a prominent Shia opposition group in Iraq. According to the press, the Iraqi authorities are held responsible for the death of twenty two members of the Hakim family.

J) CW Attack on Kurdish Village of Halabja, 16 March 1988:4-5,000  
Kurdish civilians were killed. The attack was aimed at revenge on the Kurdish inhabitants who had assisted the Iranians and as a warning to other Kurds of what to expect if they defied the Baghdad authorities"

K) Saddam Hussain's son, Udai: On 19 October 1988, Udai Saddam Hussain killed a Palace employee. Though in detention for a period of three months, he was released without charge and sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Geneva. He was subsequently expelled from Switzerland and is currently back in Iraq.

L) Execution of Journalist for the Observer, Farzad Bazoft on 15 March 1990, and Swedish national, Jalil Mahdi Salih Nu'aymi on 11 July 1990

Middle East Section  
RAD FCO  
14 August 1990

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Page 3

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

14<sup>th</sup> August 1990

Prime Minister  
Agree Rules of Engagement?

DM  
15/8

Dear Charles

*attached*

I wrote to you yesterday evening with (inter alia) our proposal for a revised concept of operations for the ARMILLA patrol to include the tasks of monitoring and, if necessary, enforcement of UN sanctions in addition to its existing tasks in support of British shipping and friendly Gulf states. In my letter I said that a complete ROE profile for this concept would be submitted today. The attached profile has been agreed by the COS and by my Secretary of State. The Defence Secretary would be grateful to know that the Prime Minister and other colleagues are content so that appropriate instructions can be issued to the Patrol.

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Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



SECRET UK EYES A b

I am sending copies of this letter and attachment to Dominic Asquith (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

*Janet Binstead*

(MISS J R BINSTED)  
Private Secretary

SECRET UK EYES A

# The National Archives

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|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <u>PREM 19</u> .....                                                                                                                                      | Date and<br>sign |
| PIECE/ITEM ..... <u>3076</u> .....<br>(one piece/item number)                                                                                                                        |                  |
| Extract details:<br><br><u>Attachment to letter from</u><br><u>Birstead to Powell</u><br><u>dated 14 August 1990</u><br><u>(Two copies: 1 original, 1 annotated</u><br><u>by PM)</u> |                  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....                                                                                                                                                     |                  |
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

*See Dominic.*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

BF 11  
The Prime Minister has again referred to the need for effective counter-propaganda against Iraq. I have explained that the Department are working on putting together material and this needs to be done carefully if it is to have the maximum effect. The Prime Minister hopes very much we can have something ready by the end of the week.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely*

C. D. POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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A. SANCTION

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

## IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has noted reports that a number of countries are engaged in preparing to break or circumvent sanctions against Iraq.

She welcomes the effective action we have taken in the case of South Africa. The particular problem of Jordan is being discussed separately. She has commented on Hungary's apparent intention to evade sanctions and said that we should find a way to bring this to the attention of the Hungarian authorities. We should not be giving assistance, in this case from the Know-How Fund, to countries which are defaulters on sanctions. She thinks we should also consider an approach to Malaysia.

BF // You no doubt have these points in hand, but I should underline the Prime Minister's personal interest in seeing this followed up.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

The Hon Dominic Asquith,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DOMINIC  
CAROLINE

IRAQ/KUWAIT

High Intelligence  
Staff (of Secretariat)  
PM  
PL  
FERB  
W. Waldegrave  
MOD Minister

and no others.

There is quite a well-established drill for this week. JIC do a highly-classified morning Sitrep. which takes in all overnight information. It arrives about 1015 and should be faxed down to the Prime Minister. With this, she is unlikely to need any telegrams.

William Waldegrave chairs a coordination meeting at 1100 every day, which is attended by Robin Butler and Percy Cradock among others. There is no need for you to go: but one or other of them will probably touch base before or after. There is a written note of its conclusions in the early afternoon, which is a useful summary of action in hand. I would not send it to the Prime Minister since it might only stimulate interventions: but it is handy for answering/parrying her questions. Any specific requests for authority to do something will reach you in Private Secretary letters from FCO (probably Dominic Asquith this week) or MoD, and should be faxed down.

The situation next week is less clear. The Prime Minister is back on Tuesday, and both the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary are in the country and available. I imagine the Prime Minister will want to chair a meeting to take stock on Tuesday or Thursday (in diary terms a meeting on Wednesday would be difficult). Barring accidents I would go for Thursday, which should carry you through the weekend and Bank Holiday.

I have told the White House of my whereabouts and advised them to contact either of you in an emergency.

On my own front, the papers for the Finnish visit should come in next week. I will process them on return, and do a short speech. I have already done a draft speech for the EDU.

*C. D. Powell*  
(C. D. POWELL)

14 August 1990

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10 DOWNING STREET -

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

*Dear Dominic,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

I spoke to General Scowcroft at lunchtime to convey our concern about the use of the port of Aqaba to evade sanctions against Iraq. We were not aware of any action yet to interdict shipping going to or from Aqaba. We saw that mainly as a task for the Americans or other Western navies, since our effort was mainly in the Arabian Gulf. The worst outcome would be if the Israelis were to try to interdict such shipping. But until something was done, Aqaba would remain a major hole in the sanctions arrangements. General Scowcroft said that the Americans fully shared our concern. Quite by coincidence, he had just come off the telephone with King Hussein who had asked to come across to the United States immediately to talk to the President about this and other problems. He would probably come on Thursday morning. The King had not given much indication of how helpful or otherwise he was going to be, although it was probably a good sign that he had asked for a meeting. General Scowcroft said that it would be very helpful to the Americans if we could let them have any thoughts about what might be put to the King. I said that I would arrange for these to be passed through the Embassy in Washington.

I took the opportunity to suggest to General Scowcroft that it was important to avoid being heavy-handed in attempts to co-ordinate the actions of Western navies in the Gulf. This sort of co-ordination functioned best if it was done at an operational level, without a large political flag stuck on it. General Scowcroft said he had not been aware of sensitivities in this area and was glad to have them drawn to his attention.

I told General Scowcroft that the Prime Minister would find it helpful to have, on a very private basis, some indication of the likely American response to CW attack by the Iraqis should that happen. General Scowcroft said he would like to talk to me about that at some point. I said that I would be away for a few days. He said he would put some thoughts in a message.

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b

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
C.D. POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,  
Office of the Minister of State,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET UK EYES A

Copy 5 of 5 copies

file 10  
hm

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

Dear Jane,

BM Thank you for your letter of 14 August about the problems which have arisen over the Rules of Engagement for our Tornado aircraft in Saudi Arabia. I have shown this to the Prime Minister who is seized of the problem. She understands that every effort will be made to resolve it tomorrow, so that our aircraft can start combat air patrols. If the fact of the present disagreement were to become public, it would be damaging both to us and to the multinational force. I hope you will be able to let us have some recommendations by tomorrow evening.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Miss Jane Binstead,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET UK EYES A





SECRET UK EYES A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone: 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

14<sup>th</sup> August 1990

*Prime Minister*

*Dear Charles,*

*You will want to see  
this advice. There should be  
a clear recommendation  
however. CAP. 14/8*

You asked for advice on the demarche from Prince Bandar, reported in Washington's telegram 1915, in which he asked for our air defence Rules of Engagement ROE) to be brought in line with US and Saudi Rules.

Following the deployment of Tornado F3 aircraft to Dharan, we have been attempting to clarify the concept of operations with the US and Saudi Arabia and, in particular, to establish whether the ROE agreed for OP GRANBY (attached to Simon Webb's minute of 9 August) were compatible with US and Saudi instructions.

A UK team visited Washington on 10/11 August and, as a result of its discussions, we were reassured that the UK and US ROE were broadly similar. In essence, we believed both forces had instructions to fire on Iraqi combat aircraft only after they had committed a hostile act or were unmistakably preparing to commit one. Collateral for this interpretation was given by our liaison officer with Cinc CENTCOM.

On Sunday evening (12 August) the Air Commander British Forces Arabian Peninsula, (ACBFAB) advised that the concept of operations already in place utilised AEW patrols by Saudi and USAF E3(AWACS) aircraft to identify Iraqi aircraft and control interceptions; and that this information was then passed to a Saudi Sector Operations Commander (SOC), who has the authority (if time permits in consultation with the superior formation in Riyadh) to order or deny an engagement. AVM Wilson was tasked by the Joint Commander to advise on both the reliability of E3 identifications and the criteria for deciding whether an Iraqi aircraft was hostile, in order to ascertain whether this concept of operations was acceptable and compatible with the ROE currently in force. He has now advised that, while the identification arrangements appear satisfactory, the Saudis would regard any Iraqi aircraft (military or civilian) which penetrated Saudi airspace by more than 10nm as hostile, regardless of whether it had committed any hostile act. This is not consistent with our ROE nor with what we had understood had been approved in Washington, though we are informed

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



SECRET UK EYES A



that the US are now operating to these Saudi ROE.

If this is so it poses an acute dilemma for us. We are participating in a joint operation at the invitation of the Saudi Government and it is manifestly essential that our ROE are consistent with the US and Saudi forces; and that we operate within the overall arrangement for the co-ordination of the air defence of Saudi Arabia. If the Saudis are indeed operating the system outlined above, there are potential difficulties which need to be resolved in regard to both the position in international law and their prudence. On the former, it is essential that any action can be justified as a necessary and proportionate response to the perceived threat. On the latter, it is vital to avoid any accident or incident which could result in the escalation of tension in the area or provide an excuse for further acts of Iraqi aggression. It is clear, however, that, if we cannot agree to Saudi co-ordination, we could well find ourselves marginalised and not accepted as part of a joint operation: indeed we are at present not being used on combat air patrols.

We sought, as a matter of the greatest urgency, clarification, from both Washington and Riyadh, on the precise nature of the criteria the Saudi SOC will use to order aircraft to engage Iraqi aircraft. It is implicit in the reply from Jedda (Tel No 101) that Iraqi aircraft which intrude into Saudi airspace by more than 10nm will be engaged, but this is being checked.

Meanwhile our further enquiries in Washington have confirmed that the directive issued to the military by the Joint Chiefs of Staff allows the E3 AWACS only to designate an aircraft as potentially hostile and that the fighter pilot must confirm for himself that it has committed or is about to commit a hostile act before he may open fire (the criteria for "hostile act" being similar to our own).

There therefore appears to be a divergence between the directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the rules being applied in theatre. The US authorities have undertaken to clarify the situation and inform us of the outcome. Once this has been done we will be in a position to submit advice about UK Rules of Engagement and recommend the terms of a response from the Prime Minister to Prince Bandar.

SECRET UK EYES A



SECRET UK EYES A



I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department) who may wish to comment, and also to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

*Janet Binstead*

(MISS J R BINSTead)  
Private Secretary

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET

d  
060127  
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SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 132330Z FCO  
TELNO 1915  
OF 132225Z AUGUST 90  
AND TO DESKBY 132330Z MODUK  
AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, ACTOR

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY

SIC  
MODUK FOR DUS(P)

## IRAQ/KUWAIT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, PRINCE BANDAR, ASKED ME TODAY (13 AUGUST) TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
2. BANDAR SAID THAT A PROBLEM HAD ARISEN REGARDING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROES) FOR THE BRITISH TORNADOES IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI AIR FORCES WERE OPERATING UNDER COMMON ROES WHICH ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT WHEN RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH A HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. BRITISH RULES ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT ONLY WHEN VISUAL CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE SAUDIS CONSIDERED THAT THIS LACK OF STANDARDISATION IN THE ROES COULD GIVE RISE TO OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES AND POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT. THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE SENIOR BRITISH AIR FORCE OFFICER IN SAUDI ARABIA THAT THE RULES COULD BE CHANGED, IF AT ALL, ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH CABINET. PRINCE BANDAR THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SAUDI RECOMMENDATION THAT THE BRITISH ROES SHOULD BE CHANGED TO STANDARDISE THEM WITH THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI RULES.  
COMMENT
3. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN PARA 7 OF RIYADH TELNO 634 WHICH PUTS A RATHER DIFFERENT SLANT ON SAUDI ATTITUDES TO ROES. BUT BANDAR IS USUALLY WELL INFORMED AND UNLIKELY TO BE BEHIND THE GAME. IT MAY BE THAT AMERICAN PRESSURE HAS OVERCOME SAUDI RELUCTANCE. BUT IF PRINCE BANDAR IS RIGHT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE HERE THAT UK VIEWS SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE LEADING PROVIDER OF AIR DEFENCE AND THE REQUEST (HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY ARRIVED AT) OF THE HOST NATION.

MEYER

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SECRET  
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FM JEDDA  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 101  
OF 140800Z AUGUST 90  
INFO FLASH RIYADH, MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (BDS)

SIC AAA/ZAC/I9M

MODUK PSE PASS TO JFHQ HIGH WYCOMBE  
RIYADH FOR FORCE COMMANDER  
WASHINGTON FOR BDS

FROM AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA

YOUR TELNO 427 TO RIYADH: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

1. I SUSPECT TUR WAS SENT BEFORE AVM WILSON SENT HIS SIGNAL 132000Z TO JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE LAST NIGHT. I DISCUSSED MISMATCH WITH AVM WILSON LAST NIGHT HE HAD EXPLORED WITH US COMMAND AND RSAF. HAVING AT LAST SEEN TEXT OF US/SAUDI ROE WILSON APPEARED REASSURED THAT THEY DID HAVE SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS TO ACHIEVE PROPER VERIFICATION OF HOSTILE AIR TARGETS AND SO AVOID MISTAKEN ENGAGEMENT. COMBAT AREA IS CLOSED TO CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC (AIR ROUTES REROUTED). WILSON ALSO ARRANGED FOR RAF OFFICER TO BE PRESENT IN SAUDI GROUND ADOC DURING RAF PATROLS(CAPS), AND ASCERTAINED THAT BOTH US AND SAUDI AWACS FLIGHTS WILL HAVE US PERSONNEL ON BOARD. WILSON DESCRIBED US ROE AS VERY SPECIFIC, AND INVOLVING SOUND ARRANGEMENTS TO CROSS CHECK POTENTIAL TARGETS. HE ALSO REGARDED 10 MILE BUFFER ZONE AS SUFFICIENT TO CATER FOR IRAQI PROVOCATIVE PROBES. AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER 10 MILES INSIDE SAUDI AIRSPACE WOULD FALL ON SAUDI TERRITORY (AN IMPORTANT POINT).
2. WILSON HAS ACCORDINGLY RECOMMENDED WE ACCEPT US/SAUDI ROE. MOREOVER UNTIL WE DO, AMERICANS/SAUDIS REFUSE TO USE F3 ON CAPS. BOTH FORCE COMMANDER AND AM STUART PAUL SAY IT IS OPERATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN E 3 AWACS CREW TO CONTROL ENGAGEMENTS USING TWO SETS OF ROE SIMULANEOUSLY.
3. WE NOW HAVE SITUATION IN EFFECT GROUNDED UNTIL COMMON ROE ARE WORKED OUT. NOT ONLY DOES THIS VITIATE OUR AIR DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION AT A TIME WHEN IT IS MUCH NEEDED ON CAP, BUT IT ALREADY CALLS IN QUESTION WITH SAUDI MILITARY REALITY OF OUR

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COMMITMENT TO COME TO THEIR AID. OUR CAUTION WILL VERY QUICKLY UNDERMINE POLITICAL IMPACT OF OUR SWIFT CONTRIBUTION, AND RISKS OUR WHOLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RSAF. THEIR CONCERN AND RESENTMENT WILL RISE QUICKLY TO SULTAN AND THE KING (IT MAY ALREADY HAVE DONE SO, AS GENERAL TURKI WARNED WILSON LAST EVENING,) NEGATIVE EFFECTS I NEED NOT SPELL OUT.

4. IN LIGHT OF AVM WILSON'S VIEW THAT US/SAUDI ROE HAVE SOLID SAFEGUARDS, AND GIVEN POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS IMPLICATIONS ONCE SAUDIS PERCEIVE US AS NOT FULLY ALONGSIDE AMERICANS AND THEMSELVES AT THIS TIME OF DANGER, I URGE MOST STRONGLY IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE OF ROE ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY STAND. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO SIT ON THE GROUND.

5. AVM WILSON AGREES TO LOGGING WITH UN, AND ASKS THIS TO BE PURSUED BY WASHINGTON.

DUGGAN

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FM ROME  
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
TELNO U/N  
OF 141300Z AUGUST 90  
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

SIC I9M

SUBJECT IS ITALIAN RESPONSE TO GULF CRISIS

FROM ADA

AGENCY PRESS RELEASE REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING CABINET DECISION EARLY PM TODAY TWO LUPO CLASS FRIGATES PLUS THE SUPPORT SHIP STROMBOLI ARE TO SAIL FORTHWITH TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO JOIN FRIENDLY NAVAL FORCES ALREADY IN THE AREA. THEIR MISSION COULD BE EXTENDED TO THE GULF AREA FOLLOWING DECISIONS THAT MAY BE TAKEN AT WEU CONFERENCE 21 AUG. THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS COULD BE PUT TO BOTH HOUSES OF A RECALLED ITALIAN PARLIAMENT ON EITHER 22 OR 23 AUG.

WOOD

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**SECRET** / DEDIP

8(A-E)

SECRET

DEDIP

FROM AMMAN

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 415

OF 140600Z AUGUST 93

FOR HEAD NENAD

YOUR TELNO 269

**POLITICAL SITUATION IN JORDAN****SUMMARY**

1. THE KING'S PRESENT ATTEMPT TO BALANCE SUPPORT FOR SADDAM AGAINST HIS UN OBLIGATIONS IS NOT SUSTAINABLE FOR VERY LONG. IF THE CRISIS CONTINUES, HE WILL PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS TO APPLY SANCTIONS MORE FULLY THAN AT PRESENT. HE CAN PROBABLY DO THIS WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO HIS OWN POSITION. BUT HE WILL SEEK TO AVOID A CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT AND, MOST IMPORTANT, HE WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

**DETAIL**

2. THE KING IS AT PRESENT ATTEMPTING A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN TACIT SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER. IN PRACTICE THIS WOULD MEAN APPLYING SOME SANCTIONS WHILE EVADING OTHERS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HOPES TO KEEP HIS LINKS WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN OPEN, AND THUS HE WILL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE AN ARAB SOLUTION AND TO WARN AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION. IF THIS BALANCING ACT WERE TO SUCCEED, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HARNESS AND CONTROL THE WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT HERE FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN. IN THAT CASE, HIS OWN POSITION WOULD REMAIN SECURE; BUT THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY WOULD CONTINUE TO DECLINE; THE KING'S LINKS WITH THE WEST WOULD BE WEAKENED; AND IF SANCTIONS BREACHES WERE APPARENT, HE WOULD PRESUMABLY FAIL TO SECURE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE EITHER BILATERALLY OR THROUGH THE UN.

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3. I SEE THIS STRATEGY AS ONLY SUSTAINABLE OVER A VERY SHORT PERIOD. THE LONGER THE CRISIS CONTINUES, THE MORE PRESURE THE KING WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT FROM THE WEST TO COMPLY FULLY WITH SANCTIONS (AND I ASSUME THAT SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS WOULD BE OFFERED TO ACHIEVE THIS). IF SADDAM REMAINS ISOLATED, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN APPEARING TO PROLONG HIS SURVIVAL WILL BE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS FOR JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES, NOT TO MENTION THE WEST.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, A CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE KING THAT HE WILL FULLY IMPLEMENT THE UN RESOLUTIONS WOULD PRESENT AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS HOW SERIOUS THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE. MY OWN BELIEF IS THAT THE KING COULD PROBABLY GET AWAY WITH IT, EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS LEFT WITH NO CHOICE. BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO MATCH SUCH A STATEMENT WITH MORE ANTI-WESTERN AND PRO-SADDAM RHETORIC. THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL. THE REACTION OF SADDAM HIMSELF IS AN IMponderable. IN THE WORST CASE, HE MIGHT SEEK TO INCITE A POPULAR UPRISING.

5. FOR THESE REASONS, I BELIEVE THAT THE KING WILL TRY TO DUCK ANY FORM OF PUBLIC POSITION ON SANCTIONS. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES THAT THE CRISIS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE BEYOND A FEW WEEKS, HE WILL PROBABLY ACCEPT THAT JORDAN HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO APPLY SANCTIONS MORE FULLY. I SUSPECT THAT HE MAY ALREADY BE REACHING THIS POSITION. THIS WILL ENABLE HIM TO TAP WESTERN (AND POSSIBLY ARAB) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO SHORE-UP JORDAN (AND WOULD BE, EVEN IF SANCTIONS WERE NOT APPLIED). HE WILL NO DOUBT SEEK TO STAY ON TERMS WITH SADDAM AND THE PRICE FOR THIS MAY WELL BE ATTEMPTS TO BREACH SANCTIONS SECRETLY. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY AS THE IMPLICATIONS OF SANCTIONS BECOME CLEARER - BOTH THEIR EFFECTS ON JORDANIANS AND THE CONTRIBUTION THEY WOULD MAKE TO UNDERMINING SADDAM'S POSITION. BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE KING COULD MANAGE THIS ASPECT, PARTICULARLY IF HE CONTINUES IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO ADVOCATE AN ARAB SOLUTION AND TO CRITICISE WESTERN INVOLVEMENT.

6. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT WE WILL NEED TO MOUNT SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON THE KING TO PERSUADE HIM THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE

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● FULLY IMPLEMENTED (AND TO MINIMISE THE NUMBER OF BREACHES).  
 I BELIEVE THAT HE CAN BE BROUGHT TO DO THIS, AND THAT HE CAN  
 DO SO WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO HIS POSITION. BUT WE SHALL  
 HAVE TO EXPECT THAT HE WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN HIS PRESENT  
 PUBLIC LINE (FUZZY ON SANCTIONS, CRITICAL OF THE WEST). AND  
 MOST IMPORTANT, HE WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL  
 INDUCEMENTS. VAGUE PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE WILL ACHIEVE  
 NOTHING. WE CANNOT EXPECT HIM TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

7. THERE ARE RISKS TO THE KING'S POSITION, AND TO THE  
 HASHEMITE LINE, WHICHEVER WAY HE JUMPS. IF HE WERE OVERTHROWN,  
 I ASSUME THAT ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF IT DID NOT  
 THROW IN ITS LOT COMPLETELY WITH SADDAM AT THE OUTSET, WOULD  
 TRY TO GIVE HIM FULL SUPPORT. I WOULD EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE  
CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL.

8. I SET OUT BELOW TWO BALANCE SHEETS FROM THE JORDANIAN  
 POINT OF VIEW: THE FIRST, IF JORDAN APPLIES SANCTIONS; AND THE  
 SECOND, IF JORDAN REFUSES TO DO SO. THESE ARE OBVIOUSLY FAR  
 FROM COMPREHENSIVE AND BEG MANY QUESTIONS. BUT THEY MAY BE  
 USEFUL AS A QUARRY.

#### 9. JORDAN APPLIES SANCTIONS

##### A. CREDIT

(I) JORDAN CAN EXPECT TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH GCC  
 STATES, EGYPT, SYRIA, WESTERN STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION.

(II) AID WOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO HELP JORDAN SURVIVE  
 ANY LONG. THIS MIGHT LEAD ON TO AN ESTABLISHED AID  
FRAMEWORK POST-CRISIS.

(III) JORDAN'S EXTERNAL MARKETS MAY BE DIVERSIFIED WITH  
 CORRESPONDING LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS AS THE  
 ECONOMY IS WEANED FROM HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON IRAQ.

(IV) (CONCEIVABLY): ONCE THE CRISIS IS OVER, THE US MIGHT BE  
 MORE READY TO TACKLE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM MORE FORCEFULLY.

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(3)

B. Debit /

**SECRET** / *Dec 19**D***B. DEBIT**

- (I) SEVERE ECONOMIC DISLOCATION DESPITE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE.
- (II) THE GOVERNMENT MUST DEAL WITH PUBLIC UNREST WHICH MAY REQUIRE SUPPRESSION.
- (III) IF SO, THIS COULD SIGNAL THE END OF JORDAN'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT.
- (IV) IRAQI RETALIATION OR PRESSURE WHICH COULD BE UNPREDICTABLE. IRAQI MOVES IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD LIKELY BE SEEN BY THE ISRAELIS AS A DIRECT THREAT TO ISRAELI DEFENCE INTERESTS.
- (V) SADDAM MAY REFUSE TO ALLOW EXPATRIATES TO MOVE FROM KUWAIT OR IRAQ TO JORDAN.

**10. JORDAN DOES NOT APPLY SANCTIONS****A. CREDIT**

- (I) CONTINUING STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE KING.
- (II) JORDAN DOES NOT ATTRACT IRAQI THREATS OR RETALIATION.
- (III) KING MIGHT HAVE LEVERAGE TO PERSUADE SADDAM TO RELEASE FOREIGN NATIONALS TO JORDAN.

**B. DEBIT**

- (I) FURTHER DETERIORATION IN JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH GCC, EGYPT, WESTERN STATES, AND PROBABLY SYRIA.
- (II) NO EXTERNAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT.
- (III) ECONOMIC DAMAGE FROM LOSS OF TRANSIT TRADE AS SANCTIONS BITE.
- (IV) THE RISK OF INCURRING SANCTIONS ITSELF AS A SANCTIONS BUSTER WITH FURTHER ECONOMIC DAMAGE.

**SECRET** / *Dec 19*

(4)

(v) /



**SECRET** /DEDW

(V) THE DANGER THAT ISRAEL WOULD REGARD JORDAN'S CLOSER ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ AS POTENTIALLY THREATENING AND TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION, EITHER BY BLOCKADING AQABA OR DIRECTLY AGAINST JORDAN.

(VI) IF SADDAM IS OVERTHROWN, ALMOST TOTAL ISOLATION IN ARAB WORLD AND LOSS OF TRADE AND OTHER LINKS WITH IRAQ, AT LEAST FOR A PERIOD.

REEVE

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PS

PS/M Waldegrave

PS/PUS

Mr Tom Kys

Mr Goulden

Mr Miles

Mr Berman

PS/NO10 - Downing St.

Chief Assessment Staff - Cabinet Office.

Sir P. Gadoock - NO10 D. St.

**SECRET** /DEDW

(5)

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET -

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESS POOLS

At Mr Waldegrave's meeting this morning, it was agreed to ask the Prime Minister whether she would accept occasional small press pools being organised for visits to our Forces in the Gulf.

I have subsequently spoken to the Prime Minister on this point. She is prepared to agree provided they are under strict control (better control than during the Falklands war, the Prime Minister has commented). On no account should there be any discussion with them of Rules of Engagement or other operational matters.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead and David Hatcher (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL





apc SN

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has seen Kuwait telegram no. 371, reporting the slur carried by the BBC World Service. She is incensed by this and hopes that the Foreign Secretary of Mr. Waldegrave will take it up at the highest level with the BBC and insist upon a public apology.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

The Honourable Dominic Asquith,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SN



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FOR EMERGENCY UNIT.

KUWAIT/ IRAQ

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE BBC WORLD SERVICE CARRIED AT LEAST TWICE YESTERDAY (AT 1200Z AND 1500Z) "EYE WITNESS" REPORTS THAT BOTH THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN EMBASSIES WERE WITHOUT "KEY PERSONNEL" AT THE TIME OF THE IRAQI INVASION, AND THAT THOSE ACTUALLY HERE HAD FLED BEFORE THE IRAQI HORDES.
2. I APPRECIATE THAT THE BBC IS INDEPENDENT, BUT AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE BOTH STATEMENTS ARE BOTH MALICIOUS AND TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. I CAN ONLY ASSUME BLACKLEY IS THE SOURCE OF THE STORY EXCLAM.

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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
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HD/AMD

HD/ECD(E)

MR FRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,

(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

CABINET OFFICE DIO

(BY TUBE H29)

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (D) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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062214  
MDADAN 9319

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FM BAHRAIN  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 230

ADVANCE COPY

OF 141430Z AUGUST 90

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO  
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR, MODUK, CINCFLEET, SNOE, RNLO GULF DUBAI

SIC 19M

RIYADH PASS TO AIR VICE MARSHALL S WILSON (ADC)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAHRAIN

## SUMMARY

1. AMIR AND CROWN PRINCE INSISTENT THAT BRITAIN SHOULD MAKE SOME DEPLOYMENT TO BAHRAIN. NO REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. WELCOME FOR BLOCKADE. NO BAHRAINI DEPLOYMENT TO ARAB FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA. EXPECTATION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE DISLODGED BY US MILITARY ACTION.

## DETAIL

2. I SAW THE AMIR AND (WITH FOF2, CO YORK AND LEADER BMAT) THE CROWN PRINCE TODAY. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THEIR VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR MORE UK HELP TO BAHRAIN AND MY ATTEMPTS TO DAMPEN EXPECTATIONS (MY U/N 141350Z AUG TO MOD).

3. THE AMIR DID NOT GIVE ME THE EXPECTED REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HE THANKED ME FOR IT BUT, AS THERE IS NO CURRENT UK DEPLOYMENT TO BAHRAIN, HE CLEARLY FELT HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY IN WRITING. I EXPLAINED WHY I THOUGHT OMAN HAD BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE JAGUARS AND STRESSED THAT BOTH RAF AND RN DEPLOYMENTS WERE FOR THE DEFENCE OF BAHRAIN AS OF OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. THAT CUT NO ICE.

4. THE AMIR MADE THE FOLLOWING OTHER POINTS:

(A) HE WELCOMED OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE BLOCKADE OF IRAQ BUT ASKED WHAT FORCE THERE WAS IN THE CLAIM THAT IT WAS ILLEGAL. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE KUWAITIS AND THAT WAS ENOUGH.

*Prime Minister*  
*Alan Clark will*  
*report further after*  
*his visit. If he confirms*  
*the Bahraini view, we*  
*shall have to*  
*send some*  
*more*

*aircraft.*  
*CA*  
*14/8*

PAGE 1

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MDADAN 319

(B) HE WAS SURE, THOUGH HAD NOT BEEN TOLD, THAT THE US WOULD FIND A PRETEXT TO MOUNT AN OPERATION AGAINST THE IRAQIS IN KUWAIT AS SOON AS THEIR FORCES WERE READY. I STRESSED THAT UK DEPLOYMENTS WERE PURELY DEFENSIVE.

(C) BAHRAIN DID NOT (NOT) INTEND TO SEND TROOPS TO THE ARAB FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA BEYOND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE PENINSULAR SHIELD.

(D) HE HOPED NO MORE BRITONS WOULD LEAVE: I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THOSE WHO INTENDED TO GO HAD GONE.

5. THE CROWN PRINCE ALSO EXPECTED SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BE FORCED OUT OF KUWAIT BY MILITARY ACTION. I ASKED IF HE MEANT THE ARAB FORCE: HE SNORTED - OF COURSE NOT, BY THE AMERICANS. HE WELCOMED UK DEPLOYMENTS. THE AMERICANS NEEDED THAT, BOTH AS SUPPORT AND TO KEEP THEM IN CHECK. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONFLICT. WHAT SORT OF IRAQ WOULD THERE BE? IT MIGHT DISINTEGRATE. I SAID THAT A STABLE STRONG IRAQ UNDER MODERATE LEADERSHIP WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A DESTABILISING DISINTEGRATION. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT THE GCC WOULD NEED TO TAKE ITS DEFENCE MORE SERIOUSLY IN FUTURE AND WOULD BE LOOKING FOR FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES: THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES IN FUTURE TO BE PUT OFF BY THE NOISES OF THE RADICALS. HE (LIKE THE AMIR) LAMENTED KING HUSSEIN'S TOTAL LOSS OF GRIP, SYMBOLISED BY HIS USE OF THE TITLE SHERIF, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE RISK INHERENT IN THE POTENTIAL COLLAPSE OF JORDAN.

SHEPHERD

YYYY

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MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR FAIRWEATHER

HD/SECPOL D  
HD/AMD  
HD/ECD(E)  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

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062313  
MDADAN 9326

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FM KUWAIT

TO DESKBY 141715Z FCO

TELNO 380

OF 141620Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ACTOR, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

FOR EMERGENCY UNIT

MY TELNO 364: CROSKERY

1. MY CONSUL HAS SPENT THE WHOLE DAY IN ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO LOCATE MR CROSKERY'S BODY.
2. THE IRAQI MILITARY AUTHORITIES GAVE US FULL COOPERATION AND PROVIDED AN ESCORT AT LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEVEL (EX SANDHURST /CAMBERLY STAFF COLLEGE) THROUGHOUT THE SEARCH. A LARGE AREA AROUND A POINT 2 KMS NE OF RUGI WAS QUARTERED BUT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF A BODY OR EVIDENCE OF A SHOOTING. IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED AT AL SALMI CLAIMED THEY HAD NOT FIRED ANY SHOTS IN RECENT DAYS, NOR HAD THEY HEARD THE SOUND OF GUNFIRE.
3. WHILE THERE IS NO WAY OF TELLING WHETHER THE IRAQIS ARE PLAYING STRAIGHT, I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT I CAN SEE LITTLE FURTHER ACTION WE CAN TAKE.

WESTON

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR GOULDEN

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/AMD

HD/ECD(E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,

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MDADAN 326

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HD/NEWS D  
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(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 2  
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KW



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

BF // This is to confirm that the proposed message from the Prime Minister to President Mubarak can issue, as we informed the Emergency Unit last night.

CHARLES POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

K



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

MINISTER (DP)'S VISIT TO THE GULF

I have had a further word with the Prime Minister this morning about Mr Clark's visit to the Gulf. On the understanding that he is departing tomorrow 15 August, she agrees that it would be appropriate to use a VC10, although she hopes that advantage will be taken of the flight to ferry out others required in the Gulf and/or supplies.

The Prime Minister would wish Mr Clark to give her warm personal regards to each of the Rulers whom he meets and to underline Britain's support for them. He might usefully point out the speed and effectiveness of our military response to the Gulf conflict compared with the slower and more distant French response. He should not make any specific commitments about further British forces, but should report back with any requests. The Prime Minister assumes that the FCO will provide political briefing.

We would be ready to announce Mr Clark's visit from No 10 as soon as we have agreement of the Governments concerned. I attach a draft of the sort of statement we would intend to make. I should be grateful if you could give any comments to Terry Perks in the No 10 Press Office. I understand that Mr. Clark does not intend to take press on the aircraft.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

David Hatcher Esq  
Ministry of Defence

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At the request of the Prime Minister, the Honourable Alan Clark, M.P., Minister of State (Defence Procurement), will visit Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE from 15-17 August.

During his visits, Mr Clark will meet members of the Ruling Families and Ministers to discuss developments in the region following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Background

The precise itinerary is:

Bahrain - August

Qatar - August

Abu Dhabi - August

Dubai - August





# THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

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FROM THE MINISTER FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP  
Minister of State  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Whitehall  
LONDON  
SW1A 0AA

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB  
TELEPHONE 01-276 3000

My Ref:

Your Ref:

COP  
12/8

14<sup>th</sup> August 1990

Dear William,

## AVIATION SECURITY

The Department of Transport is actively pursuing various aviation and shipping questions in relation to the crisis in the Gulf: this letter is to inform you and our colleagues of our actions on aviation security. The position has taken account of the assessment of the threat prepared by the Security Services on 9th August and subsequent events.

The threat to British airline operations outside the United Kingdom has increased, in particular in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region. The security of civil aviation is a host state responsibility, and at the request of this Department the FCO has asked British posts to consult the appropriate authorities in foreign states to convey to them our perception of an increased threat, and to invite them to ensure the security of British airline operations. We have informed British airlines of this and have asked them to review the security arrangements they are afforded overseas and to bring to the attention of this Department any major difficulties which cannot be resolved locally.

British airlines (including Cathay Pacific) have been reminded about the procedures they should adopt when operating in the vicinity of warships. These procedures were developed during hostilities in the Gulf in 1988. The Ministry of Defence have been asked to remind the Royal Navy about the procedures, and the FCO have been invited to ask posts in Gulf states to bring them to the attention of the Commanders of foreign naval units in the area. The US Navy will be very sensitive to aircraft movements in the vicinity of their ships and our instructions are consistent with their procedures.

The routing of aircraft in the Gulf area is already affected by the closure of Iraq and Kuwait airspace. Routing civil aircraft clear of areas of conflict will be undertaken by the appropriate air traffic control authorities in the area, and

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British airlines (primarily British Airways) are alert to the situation. The question of developing advice to airlines in response to changes in the situation is being addressed by this Department and the FCO: the FCO has been invited to communicate directly with the National Air Traffic Control Services in order that they may relay timely advice to airlines.

The threat to Civil Aviation interests in the UK is assessed low. The Department is sensitive to the Security of US airline operations in the UK, but considers that the enhanced measures in place to meet the longstanding threat are sufficient. The Department will monitor the security of British airlines operating in the UK, and also aircraft of Australia and France and other airlines of countries which have committed forces in the Gulf.

The United States Federal Aviation Authority have not issued any specific instructions or advice to United States airlines since the crisis in the Gulf developed. The FAA have merely relayed to US airlines "travel advisory" notices which the US State Department has issued for the guidance to US citizens.

The security of aviation will be kept under constant review.  
/ I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John Major, John Wakeham, David Waddington, Peter Lilley, Sir Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

*Howson*  
*Rogers*

ROGER FREEMAN

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AUG 15 '90 14:42 FROM NUMBER 10

PAGE. 002

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

Prime Minister

14 August 1990

Mr Waldegrave will hold a press conference with the Arab press tomorrow to put the case in terms they can relate to but in view of X below he will go easy on personal attacks on Saddam Hussein.

You asked in your letter of 13 August to my Private Secretary about material for propaganda against Saddam Hussein. This is, of course, not difficult to come by and the press has been full of horror stories both from the past and from the present. I attach a list of some of the best known horrors going back to 1959.

There is a problem about this approach, however. The more the Government trumpets Saddam's atrocities, the more the question comes up, why did you go on doing business with him for so long? (We, like the Americans, kept credit lines open throughout the Iran/Iraq war, for example.) What is more we now have a large number of potential hostages to add to the unfortunate Ian Richter who is still in jail in Baghdad. My own view is that there is really no need for the Government to feed the flames of anti-Saddam feeling because they are blazing merrily away in any case. I do not think that propaganda in this country is really the issue; it is winning the battle in the Arab states which is important and that is a much more complex issue. They do not doubt Saddam's ruthlessness; that is probably partly why the radicals respect him.

The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

Charles Powell Esq  
No. 10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

AUG 15 '90 14:43 FROM NUMBER 10

PAGE.003

## CONFIDENTIAL

## THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI REGIME UNDER SADDAM HUSSAIN

Introduction

1 The Ba'ath Party seized power in a military coup in July 1968, and has ruled Iraq ever since. Saddam Hussain became Vice President in 1969 and succeeded President Hassan al-Bakr in 1979, though he had been the real power in Iraq since the mid 1970s.

2 Since 1968 the regime has ruled by fear: it is one of the most repressive in the world. The government, with Saddam Hussain at its head, consists of ruthless men who do not hesitate to use violence to suppress any suspicion of opposition. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed or have disappeared over the years, most of whom have gone unreported. Iraqi dissidents and exiles have been hunted down and assassinated abroad. The government has subjected its citizens to forced relocation and deportations, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary and political executions almost as a matter of course.

3 Saddam Hussain has set the tone for the system of murder and repression and has personally killed opponents. He surrounds himself in an aura of terror, and over the years he has progressively killed or edged out all possible rivals. Often, this is done under the veil of revolutionary justice. For example, RCC decree No 6 of November 1986 (which is still in force) prescribes the death penalty for the deliberate and public insult of the President, the RCC, the Ba'ath Party and the National Assembly.

Human Rights Organisations

4 Human Rights Organisations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have consistently condemned Iraq's record. Most recently, in February 1990, the Middle East Watch's report on human rights in Iraq commented as follows:

"Iraq is a well organised police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. ... With the exception of freedom of worship, the Iraqi government denies its citizens all fundamental rights and freedoms and ruthlessly suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent."

5 In February 1989, Amnesty International, in its report entitled: "Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression", highlighted brutality towards children as routine in Iraqi prisons - mainly to make them give information about relations. To quote a short passage:

"At least 30 methods of torture have been used in Iraqi prisons. ... We have received reports of

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AUG 15 '90 14:44 FROM NUMBER 10

PAGE.004

## CONFIDENTIAL

children having been victims of beatings, whippings, sexual abuse and electric shock treatment. Some young people are reported to have died after torture."

6 A final general example of the Iraqi regime's appalling disregard for human life was the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict, in which over 100,000 Iraqis and over 250,000 Iranians died.

Examples

A) Attempted Assassination of President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959.

Saddam Hussain, at the age of 22, played a prominent role in this abortive attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President. According to David Hirst, in today's Guardian, it was not his first. In his teens he is said to have murdered a shepherd, and before 1959 had committed three more murders.

B) Murder of Nasir Al-Hani, first Foreign Minister after the 1968 Ba'athist coup. In 1968, his body was found riddled with bullets in a ditch outside Baghdad. This was the first of a series of Ba'athist political killings which it was believed was to assure that Saddam Hussain had no rival.

C) Hardan Tikriti, former Ba'athist Defence Minister. In 1971 he was machine gunned down in Kuwait by Iraqi security.

D) 1 July 1973 Attempted Coup, led by the Director of Security, Nazim Kazzar. This was followed by mass executions of Iraqi officers, including Kazzar.

E) Assassination in London on 9 July 1978 of General Abdul Razzak al-Naif, (a former Prime Minister of Iraq for a short period in 1968). The Iraqi murderer, Salim Hassan, was caught and is currently serving a life sentence for terrorist murder in a British prison.

F) Saddam Hussain becomes President of Iraq: In July 1979, Saddam Hussain replaced President Hassan al-Bakr. In the following purge, some accounts suggest that 500 senior Ba'athists were executed in the first two weeks of his Presidency. The purge was not only directed against dissidents (Kurds, Communists and disaffected Shia), but also against Ba'athists and old associates who might have been a threat to him. The deaths not only occurred via quasi-legal proceedings in the revolutionary courts, but also by the security apparatus who shot victims in the street, including central Baghdad. At least five members of the RCC were murdered, with Saddam insisting that a number of his colleagues on the RCC personally did the killing.

G) Execution of Bakr Sadr, April 1980; Shia religious leader. This was followed by another purge of army officers, with at least twenty being executed.

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## CONFIDENTIAL

H) Destruction of the town of Al Dujayl (40 miles NE of Baghdad):  
 In July 1982, an assassination attempt occurred near this village. According to a report in the Economist, Iraqi security's retaliation was swift and brutal. 150 families disappeared, assumed murdered, and the rest of the inhabitants (the village had 2,000 people) were deported, the men were sent north and the women and children to the south. The village was then completely destroyed.

I) Murder of Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum in January 1988:  
 Leading Iraqi Shia exile who fled Iraq in 1969, and brother of the leader of a prominent Shia opposition group in Iraq. According to the press, the Iraqi authorities are held responsible for the death of twenty two members of the Hakim family.

J) CW Attack on Kurdish Village of Halabja, 16 March 1988: 4-5,000 Kurdish civilians were killed. The attack was aimed at revenge on the Kurdish inhabitants who had assisted the Iranians and as a warning to other Kurds of what to expect if they defied the Baghdad authorities"

K) Saddam Hussain's son, Uday: On 19 October 1988, Uday Saddam Hussain killed a Palace employee. Though in detention for a period of three months, he was released without charge and sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Geneva. He was subsequently expelled from Switzerland and is currently back in Iraq.

L) Execution of Journalist for the Observer, Farzad Bazoft on 15 March 1990, and Swedish national, Jalil Mahdi Salih Nu'aymi on 11 July 1990

Middle East Section  
 RAD FCO  
 14 August 1990

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Page 3

TOTAL P.05



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

Prime Minister

14 August 1990

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line

The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

Charles Powell Esq  
No.10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

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## CONFIDENTIAL

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## CONFIDENTIAL

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Page 2



## CONFIDENTIAL

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Middle East Section  
RAD FCO  
14 August 1990

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Page 3



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister is concerned to see that some of the smaller Gulf States feel that we have not been sufficiently attentive to their security needs and concerns in the present crisis, and are disappointed that we have decided to put our main military assets into Saudi Arabia and Oman in preference to them. She has also noted the intense diplomatic activity being conducted by the French Government in sending emissaries of Ministerial level around the world and in particular through the Gulf to explain what France is doing and to offer help. In the light of this, she thinks that a Minister should travel immediately out to the Gulf to convey reassurance to the smaller states, explain the measures we are taking and offer to meet any particular needs. The states in question are Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar. At the same time we should try to arrange for early rotation of some of our military aircraft through Bahrain and possibly the UAE to give visible evidence of our presence, in addition to the visit of HMS York to Bahrain. The Prime Minister would not want to see the present crisis erode our traditionally strong position in these states.

The Prime Minister is aware that both the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary have it in mind to visit the area and our forces at the end of the month or in early September. She sees the present need as more limited and more urgent: an immediate demonstration of our support and concern. There would be no need to take in Oman and Saudi Arabia or visit our own forces at this stage. Forty-eight hours should be sufficient.

The Prime Minister assumes that it would be impossible for you to get away since you are coordinating the Government's response to the present crisis. She would hope that a Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 2 -

Minister could make a visit later this week, perhaps as early as tomorrow. I understand that Minister (DP) is on call.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead and Julian Scopes (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

The Hon William Waldegrave MP

CONFIDENTIAL





|                                                                          |                  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br><u>PREM 19</u>                                      | Date and<br>sign |
| PIECE/ITEM .....<br>(one piece/item number) <u>3076</u>                  |                  |
| Extract details:<br><br><u>Telex Washington to MOD</u><br><u>13/8/90</u> |                  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....                                         |                  |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)<br>OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958            |                  |
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FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 132330Z FCO

TELNO 1915

OF 132225Z AUGUST 90

AND TO DESKBY 132330Z MODUK

AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, ACTOR

SIC

MODUK FOR DUS(P)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, PRINCE BANDAR, ASKED ME TODAY (13 AUGUST) TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. BANDAR SAID THAT A PROBLEM HAD ARISEN REGARDING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROES) FOR THE BRITISH TORNADOES IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI AIR FORCES WERE OPERATING UNDER COMMON ROES WHICH ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT WHEN RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH A HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. BRITISH RULES ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT ONLY WHEN VISUAL CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE SAUDIS CONSIDERED THAT THIS LACK OF STANDARDISATION IN THE ROES COULD GIVE RISE TO OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES AND POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT. THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE SENIOR BRITISH AIR FORCE OFFICER IN SAUDI ARABIA THAT THE RULES COULD BE CHANGED, IF AT ALL, ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH CABINET. PRINCE BANDAR THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SAUDI RECOMMENDATION THAT THE BRITISH ROES SHOULD BE CHANGED TO STANDARDISE THEM WITH THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI RULES.

COMMENT

3. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN PARA 7 OF RIYADH TELNO 634 WHICH PUTS A RATHER DIFFERENT SLANT ON SAUDI ATTITUDES TO ROES. BUT BANDAR IS USUALLY WELL INFORMED AND UNLIKELY TO BE BEHIND THE GAME. IT MAY BE THAT AMERICAN PRESSURE HAS OVERCOME SAUDI RELUCTANCE. BUT IF PRINCE BANDAR IS RIGHT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE HERE THAT UK VIEWS SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE LEADING PROVIDER OF AIR DEFENCE AND THE REQUEST (HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY ARRIVED AT) OF THE HOST NATION.

MEYER

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CONFIDENTIAL FROM RIYADH

056153

MDADAN 9060

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL <sup>T192A190</sup> ~~NADVANCE~~ COPYCONFIDENTIAL  
FROM RIYADH  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 637

OF 131255Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: YOUR TELNO 415 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1908: IRAQ/ KUWAIT

KUWAITI REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

FROM: STATE OF KUWAIT  
— AMIRI DIWANTO: THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER  
— PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM  
LONDON

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I AM WRITING TO EXPRESS THE GRATIFICATION OF MY GOVERNMENT WITH THE DETERMINED ACTIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHER NATIONS HAVE TAKEN AND ARE UNDERTAKING AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT TO DEAL WITH IRAQI AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THESE EFFORTS BE CARRIED FORWARD AND THAT THE DECISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BE FULLY AND PROMPTLY ENFORCED. I THEREFORE REQUEST ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT AND IN THE EXERCISE OF THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENCE AS RECOGNISED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TAKE SUCH MILITARY OR OTHER STEPS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES DESIGNED TO FULLY RESTORE OUR RIGHTS ARE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED.

AMIR OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT

JABEL AL AHMAD AL SABAH

MUNRO

*Prime Minister*  
The Kuwaiti request. We have announced that we now have the legal basis to justify interdiction of shipping.

CD?  
13/8



PAGE 1

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1990-08-13 16:48

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MDADAN 9060

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IRAQ/KUWAIT  
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~~MR GORE BOOTH~~  
 MR FAIRWEATHER  
 MR GOULDEN  
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HD/SECPOL D  
 HD/AMD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
 CABINET OFFICE D10  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
 AUS (C) MODUK  
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
 EMERGENCY UNIT  
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| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....                                                           | Date and<br>sign                           |
| PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3076</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number)                                             |                                            |
| Extract details:<br><br><i>Undated, unsigned document</i><br><i>"South Africa: Oil imports from Iraq"</i> |                                            |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....                                                                          |                                            |
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| Extract details:<br><br>Waldgrave to PM<br>13/8/90<br>(Two copies: original and copy<br>annotated by PM) |                  |
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PRIME MINISTER  
IRAQ/KUWAIT

It is apparent that some of the smaller Gulf States are a bit miffed that we have decided to put our military assets into Saudi Arabia and Oman, and none into them. This applies particularly to Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, both of whom have spoken in this sense. Abu Dhabi has also pointed out that we have not sent any emissaries to explain things and reassure them, while the French have already had someone out from Paris to do the rounds (probably selling arms I should think).

I think it would be a good idea for us to get someone out there pretty swiftly. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary intend to go at the end of the month/early September, but I am sure we cannot wait that long. William Waldegrave cannot really be spared at present, as he is acting as Minister in Charge here. The obvious candidate for a quick trip to see our forces and to call on the Bahrainis and UAE would be Archie Hamilton. Agree that we should try to interest him in this mission?

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL13 August 1990

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Yes <sup>OK</sup> let him to go. If need  
be surely we can  
send another Squadron  
of Tornados  
no

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

It is apparent that some of the smaller Gulf States are a bit miffed that we have decided to put our military assets into Saudi Arabia and Oman, and none into them. This applies particularly to Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, both of whom have spoken in this sense. Abu Dhabi has also pointed out that we have not sent any emissaries to explain things and reassure them, while the French have already had someone out from Paris to do the rounds (probably selling arms I should think).

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C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

13 August 1990

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FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 131630Z FCO

TELNO 414

OF 131420Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BANK OF ENGLAND, TREASURY, DTI, MODUK, UKDEL IBRD  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR, CABINET OFFICE  
 INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT

SIC

JORDAN AND SANCTIONS

## SUMMARY

1. CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR OF CENTRAL BANK AND WITH MINISTER OF FINANCE. THE LATTER MAKES CLEAR THAT, APART FROM EXPORT LICENCES TO IRAQ, SANCTIONS ARE NOT YET BEING APPLIED AND THAT JORDAN CANNOT APPLY THEM WITHOUT GUARANTEES OF COMPENSATION.

## DETAIL

2. I CALLED TODAY (13 AUGUST) ON THE GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK AND ON THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. MIFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS (AND COSTINGS) WHICH JORDAN WILL FACE IN APPLYING SANCTIONS.

3. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED US OF THEIR INTENTION TO APPLY SANCTIONS, NOTHING IN PRACTICE HAS YET BEEN DONE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CANCELLING EXPORT LICENCES TO IRAQ, TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION. JARANEH SPELT OUT THE SITUATION VERY CLEARLY. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A MANAGEABLE CRISIS FOR JORDAN. UNLESS JORDAN RECEIVED COMPENSATION, THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS WOULD BRING THE COUNTRY TO ITS KNEES WITHIN 3 MONTHS. AN ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY OF OIL ALONE WOULD COST DOLLARS 600 M PER YEAR. THE TOTAL COST OF SANCTIONS TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WOULD BE AT LEAST DOLLARS 1BN. UNLESS COMPENSATION COULD BE GUARANTEED, HE, AS FINANCE MINISTER, WOULD HAVE TO ADVISE HIS GOVERNMENT THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT APPLY THE SANCTIONS.

4. I POINTED OUT TO JARDAEH THAT THE DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN AND NOTIFIED TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, HE REPLIED APART FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXPORT LICENCES, THE COUNTRY

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CONTINUED TO FUNCTION AS USUAL: IT HAD NO CHOICE IN THE MATTER. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT A DECISION TO CONTINUE OPERATING WITH IRAQ WOULD MEAN THAT JORDAN WOULD FORFEIT ALL SUPPORT FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD (INCLUDING ARAB STATES) WITH NO GUARANTEE THAT THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ WOULD BE SUSTAINABLE. JARDANEH CONCEDED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY. WHATEVER JORDAN DID, SHE WOULD LOSE. THE TIME-SCALE WAS ALSO IMPORTANT. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT IN THE SHORT TERM (WHICH HE DEFINED AS 6 MONTHS) THE FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS WERE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF JORDAN CONTINUING TO CONTINUING TO COOPERATE WITH IRAQ. IN THE LONGER TERM, HE CONCEDED THAT THE ARGUMENTS MIGHT POINT IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. HE EMPHASISED THAT MANY OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS WERE OUTSIDE HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT OTHERS PROBABLY HAD A DIFFERENT VIEW.

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COMMENT

5. THE KING HAS MADE NO PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT ON SANCTIONS OTHER THAN HIS INITIAL REFERENCE TO JORDAN UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER (MY TELNO 397). THE RESULT IS THAT THE POPULATION AT LARGE, AND MUCH OF THE COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, IS PROBABLY UNAWARE OF THE DECISION TO APPLY SANCTIONS. THE REASON FOR THE KING'S FAILURE TO SPEAK UP IS CLEAR: GIVEN THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR SADDAM IN JORDAN, AN UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SANCTIONS WOULD PROBABLY BRING THE MOBS OUT ON THE STREETS IN VERY QUICK TIME.

6. IN ANY CASE, WHAT MATTERS, I SUGGEST, IS NOT SO MUCH THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT THE EARLY APPLICATION OF THE SANCTIONS, IN FULL. IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE SHALL NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO STIFFEN THE RESOLVE OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. BUT WE SHALL ONLY SUCCEED IF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER MAJOR WESTERN PLAYERS, WE CAN OFFER THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES THAT BY APPLYING SANCTIONS, JORDAN WILL NOT SIMPLY BE COMMITTING SUICIDE. THE QUESTION OF OIL SUPPLIES (WHICH AT PRESENT COST JORDAN NOTHING SINCE THEY ARE IN LIEU OF DEBT REPAYMENT FROM IRAQ) IS PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL. UNLESS EARLY HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS ARE ORGANISED TO CONSIDER ALL THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN APPLYING SANCTIONS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY TRY TO FUDGE THE ISSUE, WHICH WILL LEAVE A GLARING HOLE IN THE SANCTIONS FENCE. THE FACT THAT THIS MAY LEAD TO JORDAN LOSING WESTERN AND ARAB SUPPORT WILL CUT LITTLE ICE UNLESS WESTERN OFFERS OF SUPPORT ARE TRANSLATED INTO FIRM COMMITMENTS.

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FM THE HAGUE  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 318  
OF 131511Z AUGUST 90  
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, MODUK NAVY  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, EC POSTS

SIC 19M

IRAQ/KUWAIT : DUTCH CONTRIBUTION TO GULF FORCE

## SUMMARY

1. DUTCH GOVERNMENT TO SEND TWO FRIGATES TO GULF.

## DETAIL

2. AT AN EXTRAORDINARY CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING, THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT AGREED TO SEND TWO FRIGATES TO THE GULF. THE SHIPS, THE ANTI-AIR WARFARE FRIGATE WITTE DE WITH AND THE STANDARD CLASS PIETER FLORISZ, ARE EXPECTED TO SAIL ON 20 AUGUST AND TO ARRIVE IN THE GULF SOME 14 DAYS LATER.

3. ALL OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION. THE GENERAL PREFERENCE AMONG MPS IS THAT THE SHIPS SHOULD OPERATE AS PART OF A UN FORCE, BUT IT IS ACCEPTED THAT THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK WANTS THE MODALITIES OF THE DEPLOYMENT TO BE WORKED OUT IN A WEU CONTEXT.

5. DEFENCE ATTACHE UNDERSTANDS FROM MODNL NAVY THAT NL DEFENCE ATTACHE LONDON IS IN TOUCH WITH MODUK NAVY NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP OVER COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF DUTCH CONTRIBUTION. DEFENCE ATTACHE HAS FURTHER BEEN TOLD INFORMALLY THAT RNLN IS KEEN TO LINK UP WITH ROYAL NAVY ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND FUELLING.

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FM PARIS  
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
TELNO U/N  
OF 131555Z AUGUST 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

SIC 19M

OPERATION GRANBY.

DA MEETING WITH AMIRAL LANXADE - MILITARY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

1. DA HAD A SHORT SITUATION UPDATE WITH AMIRAL LANXADE 131030Z AUGUST. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS :

A. SAUDI/GULF STATES.

ACCORDING TO LANXADE THE SAUDIS HAVE NOW OFFICIALLY ASKED FRANCE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE QUAI HOWEVER, ARE SAYING THAT THE STATUS OF THIS REQUEST IS UNCLEAR. A PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL ENVOY (BIANCO) IS BEING SENT TO SEE KING FAHD AND WILL NO DOUBT CLARIFY THIS. ANOTHER ENVOY IS GOING TO THE UAE TO DISCUSS ASSISTANCE. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THESE HIGH LEVEL MISSIONS.

B. FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS.

NO FURTHER REINFORCEMENT IS ENVISAGED AT THE MOMENT. IT IS THOUGHT THAT HELOS ETC + 800 ARMY PERSONNEL ON CLEMENCEAU PLUS CIVILIANS/MILITARY TECH ASSISTANCE IN GULF REPRESENTS A GOOD CONTRIBUTION. LANXADE WAS AT PAINS TO EMPHASISE THAT FRENCH CIVILIANS WERE CONTINUING TO WORK ON FR EQUIPMENT ON FRONT LINE AIRFIELDS.

C. CONTROL OF FORCES IMPLEMENTING QUARANTINE.

THERE IS FRENCH CONCERN THAT THE QUOTE CO-ORDINATION UNQUOTE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY ORGANISED IN QUARANTINE OPS. DA WAS ABLE TO INFORM LANXADE THAT A MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR 141200Z IN PARIS BETWEEN SEC(OS)/CAPTAIN SUNTER (DNW) AND FRENCH EQUIVALENTS WHICH WOULD GO SOME WAY TO RESOLVE THIS. DA WAS CAREFUL NOT TO SAY THAT CAPTAIN SUNTER HAD ALREADY HAD ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS.

D. WEU.

AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING ON 20/21 AUGUST FRANCE WILL STRESS NEED

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FOR CO-ORDINATED ACTION IN IMPLEMENTING A QUARANTINE. FURTHERMORE LANXADE SEES A NEED FOR AN ORGANISED ROTA BETWEEN NATIONS ON VARIOUS - NAVAL - TASKS, EMBARGO AND MINESWEEPING BEING EXAMPLES.

## E. FIGHTER AFFILIATION.

DA ALSO MENTIONED IN PASSING THE RAF REQUEST FOR DISSIMILAR AIR DEFENCE TRAINING BETWEEN MIRAGE AND TORNADO. THEY AGREED THAT DA WOULD PROCESS THIS THROUGH CEMA. AMIRAL POULIQUEN IS CLEARING WITH FAF THIS AFTERNOON - POSSIBLE FOR 2 DAYS TIME AT LEEMING, YORKSHIRE.

2. LANXADE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH ARE MOST CONCERNED AT THE PRO-HUSSEIN AGITATION IN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES, NOTABLY ALGERIA AND TUNISIA.

LLEWELLYN SMITH

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HD/AMD  
HD/ECD(E)  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE D10  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
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FM RIYADH

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 639

OF 131530Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, JAKARTA, MODUK

SIC AAA/I9M

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

## SUMMARY

1. AMERICAN ACCOUNT OF KELLY VISIT. AMERICANS AND SAUDIS AGREE ON NEED FOR EXILED KUWAIT LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A HIGHER PROFILE. PROBABLE USE OF FROZEN KUWAITI FUNDS TO ASSIST TURKEY. SAUDIS SEEKING MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NON-ARAB ISLAMIC STATES.

## DETAIL

2. US DCM HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KELLY'S VISIT HERE ON 11/12 AUGUST. DUNFORD SAID THAT, AS WE WOULD KNOW, KELLY HAD SUCCESSFULLY VENTRILOQUIZED THE REQUIRED LETTER TO BUSH FROM SHAIK JABER ABOUT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IN A HURRY, AND HAD OVERRIDDEN KUWAITI MISGIVINGS ABOUT ISSUING THE AMIR'S LETTER TO BUSH BEFORE CONTACT WAS MADE WITH OTHER STATES. THEY HAD HOWEVER PRESSED THE KUWAITIS TO ISSUE SUCH LETTERS TO OTHER COUNTRIES SOON, INCLUDING THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, EGYPT AND MOROCCO (BUT NOT IRAN). THE KUWAITIS HAD SEPARATELY INFORMED THE AMERICANS OF THEIR INTENTION OF ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT CALLING ON ALL STATES TO TAKE STEPS, MILITARY AND OTHER, TO LIBERATE KUWAIT (C/F MY TELNO 636).

3. DUNFORD SAID THE AMERICANS WERE CONCERNED AT SADDAM'S SUCCESS IN PUTTING HIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE ARAB WORLD. THEY WERE LOOKING FOR A PR COUNTER, AND KELLY HAD URGED SHEIK JABER AND THE KUWAITI LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A HIGH PROFILE WORLDWIDE, THEREBY GIVING THE LIE TO THE IDEA THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A QUARREL BETWEEN THE US AND IRAQ (THIS THINKING PRESUMABLY UNDERLINES SHAIKL SABAHA'S CURRENT TOUR TO LONDON AND OTHER CAPITALS).

PAGE 1

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4. DUNFORD SAID THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF FROZEN KUWAITI ASSETS DURING KELLY'S VISIT. THE KUWAITIS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT FROZEN KUWAITI MONEY SHOULD BE USED TO ASSIST TURKEY, AND THE US AGREED THAT KUWAITI MONEY PREVIOUSLY DESTINED FOR EGYPT TO ASSIST WITH FOOD PURCHASES SHOULD BE RELEASED. DUNFORD DID NOT MENTION JORDAN.

5. DUNFORD SAID THAT, AT KELLY'S MEETING WITH PRINCE SAUD, THE LATTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SAUDIS SHARED THE US VIEW ON THE NEED FOR A HIGHER KUWAITI PROFILE. SAUD TALKED OF THE DESIRABILITY OF COLLECTING AND RE-EQUIPPING KUWAITI REGULAR SOLDIERS WHO HAD FLED TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE US AMBASSADOR HAD INTERJECTED THAT THIS WOULD BE ALRIGHT SO LONG AS THE KUWAITIS WERE NOT STATIONED TOO NEAR THE BORDER, WHERE THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO PROVOCATIVE ACTION, WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT WANTED TO AVOID. SAUD HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT FURTHER SERIOUS ARAB DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WERE IN PROSPECT POST-CAIRO. HE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE SEEKING A MILITARY CONTRIBUTION FROM NON-ARAB MUSLIM STATES, AND MENTIONED INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA BY NAME (WE HAVE SEPARATELY PICKED UP ON UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE OFFERED TROOPS).

MUNRO

*Keep them observing Saudi*

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HD/CONSULAR D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D  
HD/AMD  
HD/ECD(E)  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
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OF 131800Z AUGSUT 90  
INFO FLASH MODUK WASHINGTON ACTOR  
INFO IMMEDIATE CIARO RIYADH NEW YORK MOSCOW EC POSTS ME POSTS  
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDADKUWAIT/IRAQ: SITREP 131600Z

## SUMMARY

1. EUPHORIA AT OPEN BORDER ANNOUNCEMENT DISPELLED BUT MANY KUWAITIS AND EXPATS TRIED AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO GO SOUTH. CONSTANT REPORTS OF LOW MORALE IN IRAQI ARMY. AIRPORT SERVICEABLE.

## DETAIL

2. EXFILTRATION: RCC ANNOUNCEMENT OF BORDERS OPEN SET MANY PEOPLE LOADING THEIR WAGONS AND FLEEING THIS MORNING. MOST HAD RETURNED THIS EVENING AFTER LONG QUEUES OR BEING TURNED BACK BY THE IRAQIS. ABDALY BORDER ONLY OPEN AFTER PROBABLE COMPLETION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS. SALEMY ROAD NOW BEING USED AS TEMPORARY RUNWAY 10 KMS WEST OF JAHRA AND LINED WITH MILITARY CANTONMENTS. KHAFJI ROAD AND ROADS VEERING WEST TOWARDS WAFRA RIGOROUSLY BLOCKED SUGGESTING TOTAL MILITARY NO-GO AREA.

3. MILITARY: STORIES, SOME FIRST-HAND OF IRAQI ARMY LOW MORALE, ABSENCE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DISORGANISATION. THEY VARY FROM CONSUL'S EXPERIENCES IN WAFRA AREA WHERE ORDINARY SOLDIERS WERE MILLING AROUND WITHOUT FOOD, MAPS OR DIRECTION AND ASKING WHETHER THEY WERE GOING, BACK TO OTHERS SELLING THEIR UNIFORMS AND WEAPONS FOR KD. CONSUL REPORTS NO PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENT, TROOPS THINNED OUT, FEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS ALONG ROADS SOUTH AND NO TANKS DUG IN ON ASAFAR MOTORWAY AS BEFORE. WAFRA AREA WAS CLEARLY SENSITIVE AND REMARKS OF IRAQI OFFICERS SUGGESTED IT WAS SOME SORT OF HQS AND FORCE CONCENTRATION. LARGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND PRIVATE CARS COULD BE SEEN IN THE DISTANCE IN THE WAFRA FARMS AREA.

4. ANGLICAN CHAPLAIN REPORTS AHMADI TROOPS THINNED OUT. RELIABLE BRITS REPORT ONLY TWO TANKS FROM MESSILA TO SHUWAIKH, A FEW MOBILE AA AND THINNED OUT MACHINE GUN/MORTAR NESTS. AHMADI HOSPITAL BARELY

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WORKING WITH ALL BRITISH STAFF WITHDRAWN AND IN HIDING. IN MANGAF AREA BEACH MORTARS HAVE MOVED A BLOCK INLAND. TROOPS IN FINTAS/MANGAF AREA AND THOSE REMAINING IN CITY SEEM BETTER QUALITY.

5. FAILAKA FERRY SEEN LEAVING RAS AL SALMIYA WITH AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS.

6. CIVILIAN POPULATION: FOOD AND PETROL SUPPLIES CONTINUE BUT LAWLESSNESS STILL RISING. CARS SMASHED IF THEY CANNOT BE DRIVEN AWAY. IRAQIS STILL SEARCHING BLOCKS OF FLATS IN FINTAS/MANGAF AREA LOOKING FOR ARMS. SOME REPORTS OF ASSAULTS ON WESTERNERS AND CONSTANT REPORTS OF USING THEM AS CHAUFFEURS AT GUNPOINT.

7. BANKS STILL CLOSED AND KUWAITIS REPORTED TO HAVE THROWN AWAY KEYS TO VAULT SYSTEMS. SOME TELEPHONE EXCHANGES WORKING AGAIN AND ONE OR TWO INWARD CALLS RECEIVED ON ANBASSADOR'S LINE.

8. AIRPORT: USABLE ACCORDING TO BA REP WHO REPORTS HELPFUL ATTITUDE

OF IRAQI AIRWAYS STAFF OVER MAINTAINANCE OF BA 149. CREW STUCK AT AIRPORT. BA REP BELIEVES AIRPORT WILL REOPEN AS DOMESTIC AIRPORT TOMORROW. MUCH GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TAKEN TO BASRA.

9. UTILITIES: STABLE. PURIFICATION CHEMICALS AVAILABLE FOR FORE-SEEABLE FUTURE.

10. RESISTANCE: NO RELIABLE INFORMATION BUT A PETROL TANKER STRANDED ON FOURTH RING ROAD IN THE MORNING OF 12 AUGUST DESTROYED EARLY EVENING (12TH).

WESTON

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

36

ADVANCE

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
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OF 132230Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKDEL NATO, EC POSTS  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS  
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, HAVANA, KUALA LUMPUR  
INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, BUCHAREST, ADDIS ABABA, ABIDJAN, KINSHASA  
INFO PRIORITY BOGOTAYOUR TELNO 438 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS

## SUMMARY

1. CONSIDERABLE FEELING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT UNILATERAL MILITARY MEASURES TO ENFORCE SCR 661 WOULD GO BEYOND WHAT THE COUNCIL HAS AUTHORIZED, AND THAT MILITARY ACTION SHOULD ONLY BE TAKEN IF SANCTIONS WERE SHOWN NOT TO WORK. I TAKE THE LINE IN TUR.

## DETAIL

2. MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 13 AUGUST. ALARCON (CUBA) SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE COUNCIL TO CALL FOR RESTRAINT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS ALREADY PUTTING INTO EFFECT UNPRECEDENTED SANCTIONS AGAINST A STATE WHICH HAD REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS. CERTAIN POWERS WERE AT THE SAME TIME TAKING MILITARY ACTION AT THE REQUEST OF A MEMBER STATE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THIS WAS QUITE LEGITIMATE. BUT SOME OF THOSE POWERS APPEARED TO BE ARROGATING TO THEMSELVES THE RIGHT TO PUT INTO PRACTICE DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT THE COUNCIL BEING CONSULTED. IN FACT THOSE POWERS WERE APPLYING ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD TAKEN NO DECISION TO DO SO. THIS SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: THE LOGIC WOULD BE THAT ANY STATE COULD HENCEFORTH TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION TO ENFORCE A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION. THE UNITED NATIONS HAD NEVER ACTED ON THAT BASIS IN THE PAST. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED THAT SANCTIONS WERE INADEQUATE, IT COULD DECIDE TO APPLY ADDITIONAL MEASURES. BUT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS COULD NOT ASSUME THIS RIGHT FOR THEMSELVES. SENDING SHIPS TO MONITOR SANCTIONS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM TRYING TO ENFORCE THE COUNCIL'S DECISIONS WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.

3. I SAID WE WERE PLEASED THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED QUICKLY: IT WAS IMPORTANT IT SHOULD BE VISIBLY IN

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ACTION. RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662 HAD BEEN PASSED TO BRING THINGS BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE. BUT THREATS TO OTHER STATES IN THE REGION HAD INDEPENDENTLY EMERGED: A BRITISH CITIZEN HAD BEEN KILLED YESTERDAY. I THEN READ OUT THE FIRST THREE POINTS IN TUR.

4. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THE CRISIS WAS ESCALATING. YEMEN WANTED THE COUNCIL TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONTAIN IT. THE COUNCIL SHOULD CALL FOR RESTRAINT, AS IT NORMALLY DID IN SUCH A SITUATION.

5. WATSON (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT AMERICAN ACTION WAS IN LINE WITH SCR 661, AND REQUESTS FROM STATES IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE MOST RECENT OF THESE HAD BEEN THE LETTER FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO PRESIDENT BUSH. SANCTIONS HAD TO BE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED. THEY HAD BEEN PRETTY SUCCESSFUL SO FAR BUT SOME SHIPMENTS WERE STILL REACHING IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE UNITED STATES WOULD ONLY INTERDICT SHIPPING IF THIS WAS NECESSARY. IT WOULD ACT IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITH WHOM KUWAIT HAD MADE A SIMILAR REQUEST.

6. FORTIER (CANADA) EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE ARABS HAD NOT YET FOUND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER SET OUT SPECIFIC STEPS: THE COUNCIL HAD MOVED METHODICALLY FROM SCR 660 TO SCRS 661 AND 662. NONE OF THOSE DECISIONS PROVIDED FOR THE MILITARY MEASURES NOW BEING SUGGESTED BY THE UNITED STATES. A BLOCKADE WOULD REQUIRE ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER, AND WENT BEYOND THE MEASURES IN SCR 661. BEFORE THE COUNCIL MOVED TO ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 42, THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MUST BE GIVEN TIME TO ASSESS WHETHER SANCTIONS WERE WORKING. CANADA WAS SENDING 3 SHIPS TO THE GULF, AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE TO PREVENT AGGRESSION. CANADA WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE USE OF FORCE.

7. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD STOPPED IRAQ MOVING BEYOND KUWAIT. THE CRITICAL POINT HAD NOW BEEN PASSED. THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE TIME TO SEE WHETHER SANCTIONS WERE EFFECTIVE. THIS MEANT WAITING FOR THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE'S MEETING ON 17 AUGUST AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. THE COUNCIL COULD THEN ASSESS WHETHER FURTHER STEPS WERE NECESSARY.

8. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HE WAS PLEASED THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SET UP QUICKLY: ON 10 AUGUST FRANCE HAD SENT IT DETAILS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. FRENCH SHIPS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE REGION BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH NATIONALS THERE AND

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MEMORANDUM 7100

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SCRS 660, 661 AND 662. IF IT APPEARED THAT THE EMBARGO WERE NOT BEING RESPECTED, FRANCE WOULD DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION.

9. LI (CHINA) EXPRESSED ALARM AT THE GROWING TENSION IN THE REGION. SCRS 660, 661 AND 662 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. BUT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD JUST STARTED ITS WORK. CHINA OPPOSED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE REGION BY MAJOR POWERS AND CALLED FOR RESTRAINT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE EFFORTS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL TO FIND A SOLUTION.

10. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) AGREED WITH EARLIER CALLS FOR RESTRAINT. THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEGUN ITS WORK: COLLECTIVE CONSIDERATION WAS NOW ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT EVENTS MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

11. THE (ROMANIAN) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE HOW THE SYSTEM OF PEACE AND SECURITY WORKED WHEN SMALL STATES WERE UNDER THREAT. CLEARLY, MORE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE NEEDED ON THIS ISSUE.

#### COMMENT

12. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE FEELING IN THE COUNCIL THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MUST BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO WORK, AND THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION TO ENFORCE THEM WAS PREMATURE. APART FROM WATSON (UNITED STATES) AND ME, NO-ONE THOUGHT THAT SCR 661 AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER PROVIDED LEGAL COVER FOR ACTION BEYOND MONITORING. THIS IS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE UN LEGAL ADVISERS.

13. MOST DEVOUTLY HOPE THAT NO-ONE WILL TRY TO BREAK SANCTIONS AND THEREBY CAUSE A MILITARY INCIDENT. IF THERE WERE TO BE SUCH AN INCIDENT, IT WOULD BE VITAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SANCTION-BUSTER WAS TO BLAME. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE COUNCIL COULD WELL BE PERSUADED TO MOVE TO A NEW RESOLUTION AGAINST IRAQ UNDER ARTICLE 42. OTHERWISE, AND IF THE INCIDENT WERE MESSY, THERE WOULD BE A REAL RISK OF THE BLAME BEING LAID ON THOSE ENFORCING THE SANCTIONS, AND THE PRESENT BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG THE FIVE AND IN THE COUNCIL FALLING APART.

14. A DOG WHICH DID NOT BARK WAS THE IRAQI PROPOSALS SET OUT IN BAGHDAD TELNO 754. NO-ONE EVEN MENTIONED THEM.

TICKELL

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SECRET

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

13th August 1990

COP 14/8

Dear Charles

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US DEMARCHE

I enclose a copy of a US Demarche on the setting up of a Multinational Naval Force to give full effect to the sanctions under SCR 661, received here today by Minister(DP).

We are currently examining this text urgently, in concert with the FCO. Some aspects of it are not entirely satisfactory. I will advise you further shortly.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Simon Whitely (Transport), Elisabeth Wilms~~h~~hurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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b

DEMARCHE ON MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCE

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT TO ACT WITH KUWAIT IN EXERCISING THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER AND AFFIRMED IN UNSC RESOLUTION 661, TO TAKE SUCH MILITARY OR OTHER STEPS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES DESIGNED TO RESTORE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS ARE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED.

-- IN SO DOING, THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT HAS ALSO ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO ORGANIZE AND COORDINATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

-- WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT THAT IT HAS SENT A LETTER TO YOUR GOVERNMENT INVITING YOU TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT.

-- WE HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT THAT WE ARE READY TO ORGANIZE AND COORDINATE THIS EFFORT.

-- THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WE ENVISION WOULD BE COMPOSED OF NAVAL FORCES PARTICIPATING UNDER THEIR OWN NATIONAL COMMAND BUT COORDINATED BY THE UNITED STATES, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

-- ITS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO GIVE FULL EFFECT TO THE SANCTIONS SPECIFIED IN UNSC RESOLUTION 661 BY INTERDICTING, AS NECESSARY, MARITIME TRAFFIC SEEKING TO VIOLATE THE SANCTIONS BY CARRYING PROHIBITED TRADE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE THERE WILL NOT BE A NEED FOR EXTENSIVE, OR PERHAPS ANY, INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES, AND WE INTEND TO PURSUE A VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO ASSURE THE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVENESS.

-- THIS EFFORT WILL BE STRONGLY REINFORCED BY OUR READINESS TO ACT TOGETHER IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

-- IF YOU ARE READY TO JOIN US IN THIS EFFORT, WE ASK THAT YOU INSTRUCT YOUR APPROPRIATE NAVAL AUTHORITIES TO CONTACT THE COMMANDER OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, TO INITIATE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION EFFORTS. VESSELS ALREADY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION MAY BE INSTRUCTED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE U.S. COMMANDER OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE MIDDLE EAST, LOCATED IN BAHRAIN (WE ALSO REQUEST THAT YOU NOTIFY US THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS).

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- 2 -

WE WANT TO BE PREPARED FOR A NAVAL INTERDICTION EFFORT AIMED AT GIVING FULL EFFECT TO THE UN SANCTIONS AND THAT NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO COORDINATE THIS INTERDICTION EFFORT SHOULD GO FORWARD IN MILITARY CHANNELS.

-- THE GENERAL GUIDELINES WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE INTERDICTION EFFORT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- ALL COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS BOUND OUT OF IRAQ OR KUWAIT, AND ALL COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS BOUND INTO IRAQ OR KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR SUPPLIES INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES, SHOULD BE INTERDICTED. (BECAUSE WE ESTIMATE THAT IRAQ HAS A 3-6 MONTH SUPPLY OF FOOD STUFFS, WE DO BELIEVE FOOD SHOULD BE INTERDICTED.)

-- OUR INTENTION WILL BE TO TURN AWAY ANY VESSELS NOT ACTING IN COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 661. IF A VESSEL REFUSES TO TURN AWAY OR SUBMIT TO NECESSARY INSPECTIONS, MEASURES SHORT OF FORCE WILL FIRST BE USED. IF NEEDED, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE FORCE WILL BE USED.

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LEGAL BASIS

-- A COORDINATED MULTINATIONAL NAVAL OPERATION TO INTERDICT COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS BEING TRANSPORTED TO AND FROM IRAQ AND KUWAIT BY SEA IS CONSISTENT WITH--INDEED IT IS DESIGNED TO GIVE EFFECT TO--UNSC RESOLUTION 661 WHICH IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON TRADE WITH IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

--A MULTINATIONAL NAVAL INTERDICTION EFFORT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMED IN UNSCR 661.

--WE ARE MOVING AHEAD WITH THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT KUWAIT HAS REQUESTED. THERE IS AMPLE AUTHORITY FOR THE CURRENT EFFORT IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE IRAQI ATTACK ON KUWAIT, AFFIRMED BY THE COUNCIL IN UNSCR 661.

--AS WE EXAMINE, IN ADDITION, WHETHER AND HOW THE UN CAN PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, WE NEED TO BE MINDFUL THAT ESTABLISHING SUCH A FORCE UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. WE INTEND TO EXPLORE THE MATTER FULLY WITH MEMBERS OF THE UNSC.

**SECRET**





To: MR MACLEAN *AM*

cc Ms Phippard  
Mrs Thomson (or)  
Mr Morris (No 10)

From: T J Sutton  
Date: 13 August 1990

**RECALL OF PARLIAMENT : LETTER FROM MR WALLACE**

The Lord President discussed with me the further letter from Jim Wallace of 9 August (copy attached for you and copy recipients).

He agreed that there is no cause for us to modify the position the Government has adopted following the meeting of Ministers last Wednesday. But, since we have taken steps to ensure that the Official Opposition are briefed on the actions the Government is taking, he thinks it important that Mr Wallace should also be spoken to by either or both of MoD and FCO, in order to prevent him stirring up public discussion of whether or not the House needs to be recalled.

I suggested to the Lord President that you might, in the first instance, speak to Mr Wallace, and then if it seemed necessary arrange for someone in MoD and/or FCO to speak to him as well. The Lord President agreed. Could you therefore please take this on?

*7.*  
**T J SUTTON**  
Principal Private Secretary

TJS/aw

FROM: JIM WALLACE MP  
CHIEF WHIP, SOCIAL AND LIBERAL DEMOCRATS



# HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SW1A 0AA

|                                                             |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| LORD PRESIDENT<br>OF THE COUNCIL<br>RECEIVED<br>-9 AUG 1990 |  |
| ACTION<br>FOR                                               |  |
| COPIES<br>TO                                                |  |
|                                                             |  |
|                                                             |  |

Sir Geoffrey Howe MP,  
Lord President of the Council and  
Leader of the House,  
Privy Council Offices,  
Whitehall,  
London,  
SW1A 2AT

9th August 1990

Dear Sir Geoffrey,

Thank for your letter of 6th August regarding the recall of the House of Commons.

Following yesterday's news that British troops are being sent to the Gulf to join US led forces in protecting Saudi Arabia, I would urge you to reconsider your position.

Whilst my colleagues and I support the Government's decision to commit U.K. forces, we believe that it would be preferable if the multi-national forces in the Gulf came under United Nations command. We strongly recommend that Parliament should be given an opportunity to debate such matters.

There must also be serious potential threat to the lives of the British military personnel engaged in this action, and it would be appropriate if Parliament had an opportunity to endorse the Government's decision and in doing so reassure our service men that they have the full support of Parliament.

Given these latest developments, my colleagues and I believe that the House should be recalled as soon as it is practicable to discuss the growing crisis and to endorse the Government's action.

Yours sincerely,  
Jim Wallace

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| CONFIDENTIAL   |  |        |  | IMMEDIATE  |  |

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|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ZCZC   | 1  | ZCZC                                                             | <p><i>Prime Minister</i></p> <p><i>Agree this message please?</i></p> <p><i>CBD</i></p> <p><i>13/8</i></p> |
| TC     | 2  | CONFIDENTIAL                                                     |                                                                                                            |
| CAVEAT | 3  |                                                                  |                                                                                                            |
| FM     | 4  | FM FCO                                                           |                                                                                                            |
| TO     | 5  | TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO                                               |                                                                                                            |
| TELNO  | 6  | TELNO                                                            |                                                                                                            |
| OF     | 7  | OF 131330Z AUGUST 90                                             |                                                                                                            |
| AND TO | 8  |                                                                  |                                                                                                            |
|        | 9  | YOUR TELNO 518: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK                     |                                                                                                            |
|        | 10 |                                                                  |                                                                                                            |
|        | 11 | 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to  |                                                                                                            |
|        | 12 | President Mubarak:                                               |                                                                                                            |
|        | 13 | Begins                                                           |                                                                                                            |
|        | 14 | I wanted to say how much I have admired your strength and        |                                                                                                            |
|        | 15 | diplomatic skills in dealing with the enormous problems that     |                                                                                                            |
|        | 16 | have been created by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The rallying  |                                                                                                            |
|        | 17 | of Arab support for Kuwait and for the measures taken by the     |                                                                                                            |
|        | 18 | United Nations is of the greatest importance. I know how much    |                                                                                                            |
|        | 19 | you personally have done to achieve this. Your decision to send  |                                                                                                            |
|        | 20 | attachments of Egyptian forces to assist our friends in Saudi    |                                                                                                            |
|        | 21 | Arabia and the Gulf is of great significance and very welcome to |                                                                                                            |
|        | 22 | us in Britain.                                                   |                                                                                                            |
|        | 23 | Thank you too for Egypt's ready cooperation in granting          |                                                                                                            |
|        | 24 | over-flying rights for Royal Air Force aircraft on their way to  |                                                                                                            |
|        | 25 | the Gulf.                                                        |                                                                                                            |
| ///    | 26 | I know how difficult decisions are at this moment for our        |                                                                                                            |
| //     | 27 | friends in the Arab world. If I may say so you have set a great  |                                                                                                            |
| /      | 28 | example in firm action in support of the principle that          |                                                                                                            |
|        | 29 | aggression must not be allowed to succeed.                       |                                                                                                            |

|                            |  |                    |  |                             |  |
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| File number                |  | Dept               |  | Catchword                   |  |
| POVAAT                     |  | NENAD              |  | Drafted by (Block capitals) |  |
| Authorised for despatch by |  | Initials Date/Time |  | S W J FULLER                |  |
| For CDD use only           |  | Comms reference    |  | Telegram number             |  |
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AUG 13 '90 16:43

FROM NUMBER 10

PAGE 002

010

Prime MinisterPrime Minister

Not very apposite  
- although the word  
point has some shade.

August 13, 1990

I have three suggestions which I think might be both useful and politically helpful.

eDP 13/8

First, as the days go by there may be more and more suggestions for a recall of parliament. Would it not be sensible for the Government itself to suggest this? A full discussion in the House of Commons (as in the House of Lords) could add to the weight of support which you already have and give our actions in the Gulf even greater authority. Further, if you were to initiate the idea, it would embarrass the Opposition.

Second, would it not be advisable to try and arrange that all the different forces which have come to the help of Saudi Arabia should be formally classified as United Nations forces, fighting indeed under a United Nations flag as occurred in the case of the free world's response to the invasion of Southern Korea in 1950? This would no doubt mean a new vote in the Security Council, but if, as seems possible, the enterprise in the Middle East has to continue for a some time, that vote would be invaluable both in holding together the Allies and also our public opinions. There might be a supreme United Nations commander who, in the circumstances, could, as in 1950, be nobody else than an American and, if the plan were launched soon, there should presumably be no argument about that.

In the long run, the world in its post cold-war phase will probably want to have some kind of international police force against aggression, and it would seem best to try and achieve this under the existing institution of the United Nations\*.

Third, whether or no this United Nations identity is achieved, would it not be politically useful, in relation to the other policies which we are pursuing in the European Community, for you to stress, in public statements, the European side of our collaboration in the peacekeeping forces. I remember that President Giscard d'Estaing insisted that "Europe's voice could not be silent" in the settling of the destiny of Africa or some such phrase when he sent his paratroops in the Congo in 1978.

Hugh Thomas

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

\* The United Nations force in 1950 was, of course, made possible by the so-called "United for Peace" resolution passed by the General Assembly at a time when the Soviet Union was boycotting the organisation.



Prime Minister

1

Prime Minister

Not very apposite

- although at second  
point has some shoe.

August 13, 1990

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eDP13/p

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!!!  
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Hugh Thomas

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 August 1990

Dear Charles,

*Despatched  
13/8*

A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

You agreed over the weekend that it would be right to propose to the Prime Minister that she send a message of gratitude and encouragement to President Mubarak in the wake of his spirited performance in rallying Arab support against Iraq, particularly in pushing through at the Cairo Summit on 10 August the resolution calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and military assistance to Saudi Arabia.

/ The enclosed draft is a more fullsome version of that suggested in Cairo telno 518.

*Yours sincerely*

*Dominic Asquith*

Dominic Asquith  
Private Secretary to  
The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

Charles Powell Esq  
PS/No.10

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INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK, ACTOR  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US POLICY  
SUMMARY

1. A WIDE-RANGING MEETING WITH KIMMITT. AGREEMENT TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON EXCHANGES WITH KING HUSSEIN. US INTEREST IN POSSIBLE EC ECONOMIC HELP FOR JORDAN.
2. SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR A DEMARCHE IN BAGHDAD ON DETAINED FOREIGNERS, BUT AMERICAN THINKING STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE, INCLUDING ON CONTACTS WITH RUSSIANS.
3. BAKER INTERESTED IN UK IDEAS ON USING MILITARY COMMITTEE. INITIAL VIEW THAT COMMITTEE MIGHT HAVE ROLE IF IT FOCUSED ON NAVAL OPERATIONS AND HAD NO COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION. US WILLING TO BE GUIDED BY UK ON WEU ROLE.
4. US DETERMINED TO WARN SADDAM OFF USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND AGAINST ATTACK ON JORDAN.
5. US AGREES NOT TO ISSUE FURTHER ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION WITHOUT UK AGREEMENT.
6. HINTS THAT US CONSIDERING EARLY THINNING OUT OF DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT.
7. US UNFREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS ON REASONABLE DEMAND FROM BONA FIDE KUWAITI REPRESENTATIVES.
8. US BELIEVES SCR 661 APPLIES TO ALL ACTIVITY ANYWHERE BY IRAQI AIRWAYS: KIMMITT ASKS WHAT HMG AND OTHER EUROPEANS ARE DOING.

DETAIL

9. I SPENT 45 MINUTES WITH KIMMITT (UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS) LATE ON 12 AUGUST TO COMPARE NOTES ON A NUMBER OF CURRENT ISSUES.

JORDAN

10. I TOLD KIMMITT THAT I HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON OUR DEALINGS WITH THE KING, AND GAVE HIM, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, A COPY OF AMMAN TELNO 410 (NOT TO ALL), REPORTING MR REEVE'S INTERVIEW WITH THE KING AND THE HANDING OVER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

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11. KIMMITT THANKED ME, AND GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON THE OUTCOME OF AMBASSADOR HARRISON'S MEETING WITH THE KING, PROBABLY ON 13 AUGUST.

12. KIMMITT ALSO ASKED ABOUT A PRESS REPORT WHICH HE HAD SEEN EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THAT DI MICHAELIS HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP MITIGATE THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON JORDAN: COULD WE ELABORATE? I SAID THAT I WAS UNBRIEFED, BUT WOULD INVESTIGATE: GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

FOREIGNERS DETAINED IN IRAQ

13. I TOLD KIMMITT, AGAIN ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV, IN WHICH SHE HAD ENCOURAGED THE RUSSIANS TO CONTINUE TO STAND ALONGSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH IRAQ. IN PASSING ON MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE, OUR AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN ASKED TO URGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE NATIONALS WERE STILL DETAINED. WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING IN LONDON WHAT FURTHER DEMARCHE MIGHT BE MADE IN BAGHDAD TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THOSE DETAINED IN BOTH IRAQ AND KUWAIT. EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THE HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S IRAQ/KUWAIT TASKFORCE, AMBASSADOR MCCARTHY, HAD TOLD US THAT THE US WOULD IN PRINCIPLE SUPPORT AN APPROACH OF THE KIND SUGGESTED IN YOUR TELNO 1426 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO ALL): WE WERE CANVASSING IDEAS ON WHAT PERMUTATION OF COUNTRIES WAS MOST LIKELY TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I THEN GAVE KIMMITT A COPY OF BAGHDAD TELNO 758 (NOT TO ALL) GIVING MR WALKER'S PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON REPRESENTATIONS TO THE IRAQIS.

15. IN RESPONSE, KIMMITT INDICATED THAT AMERICAN THINKING ON A FURTHER DEMARCHE TO THE IRAQIS WAS STILL AT A FORMATIVE STAGE. PRESIDENT BUSH ATTACHED HIGH PRIORITY TO THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM IRAQ/KUWAIT. THE AMERICANS HAD HAD LIMITED CONTACTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES' EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT: AND THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONSIDERATION OF WHAT FURTHER USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THE ICRC MECHANISM. THERE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NO QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES MAKING DEALS WITH IRAQ: THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS IN PUBLIC THAT ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT JUST AMERICANS, AND CIVILIANS AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, SHOULD BE FREE TO LEAVE.

16. KIMMITT CONTINUED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOW CONSIDER WHAT MIGHT BE DONE FURTHER AND THEN CONSULT US AGAIN. HE THOUGHT THAT BAKER MIGHT HAVE MENTIONED THE ISSUE TO SHEVARDNADZE, AND ASKED HIS STAFF FOR TALKING POINTS FOR BAKER TO USE WHEN HE NEXT SPOKE TO SHEVARDNADZE.

MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES AND THE UN MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

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17. I THANKED KIMMITT FOR ALERTING US TO BAKER'S ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED A KUWAITI REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND THAT IN THE US VIEW THIS PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR QUOTE INTER-DICTION UNQUOTE (MY TELNO 1908, NOT TO ALL). THE QUESTION NOW WAS WHAT IF ANY USE MIGHT BE MADE OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

18. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER HAD TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST IN THE IDEAS IN YOUR TELNO 435 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL) WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE CONSIDERING FURTHER ON 13 AUGUST. HE PROMISED US A REACTION LATER THAT DAY OR BY 14 AUGUST AT THE LATEST. BAKER'S VIEW WAS THAT US AND UK THINKING ON THIS WAS MOVING IN VERY MUCH THE SAME DIRECTION. BAKER THOUGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OPERATIONAL ROLE FOR THE UN, DOUBTED WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO THE UN FOR FURTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND AGREED THAT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE NAVAL SIDE. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO QUOTE OPERATIONALISE UNQUOTE THE SOVIET SUGGESTION (WHICH WAS NOT A FORMAL PROPOSAL) WHILE THE CHINESE REMAINED UNENTHUSIASTIC. KIMMITT ENDED BY REPEATING THAT THE MAJORITY VIEW IN THE US GOVERNMENT WAS TO FAVOUR AN APPROACH ON THE LINES SUGGESTED BY THE UK WHICH KEPT THE SOVIET UNION IN PLAY, FOCUSED ON NAVAL OPERATIONS, BUT HAD NO COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION.

19. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT FOR AN INITIAL REACTION TO THE IDEAS ON A ROLE FOR THE WEU IN YOUR TELNO 1403 (NOT TO ALL). KIMMITT'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE GUIDED BY HMG'S INSIGHTS ON WHETHER INVOLVEMENT OF THE WEU WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF WE THOUGHT A WEU ROLE HELPED BRING OTHERS SUCH AS THE DUTCH AND BELGIANS ALONG, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM FROM THE AMERICANS. THE US AND UK SAW EYE TO EYE ON NOT UNDERMINING NATO'S ABILITY TO DEVELOP A ROLE IN THE CRISIS. CLEARLY THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WANT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE WEU TO CUT ACROSS THAT. SUBJECT ONLY TO THAT RESERVATION, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER ROLE FOR THE WEU THE UK RECOMMENDED. KIMMITT ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED ALL THIS WITH BAKER.

US REACTION TO IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

20. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT IF HE COULD ELABORATE ON GENERAL SCOWCROFT'S AGREEMENT, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON TELEVISION ON 12 AUGUST (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL), THAT IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK. THERE MIGHT BE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS REMARK.

21. STRESSING THAT HE WAS UNSIGHTED ON SCOWCROFT'S REMARKS, KIMMITT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS PUT DOWN A SERIES OF MARKERS THAT IRAQI USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WOULD INVITE A SEVERE US RESPONSE. KIMMITT HAD

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EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST READ INTELLIGENCE WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE INTENTION WAS TO MAKE SADDAM THINK TWICE OR THREE TIMES ABOUT USING ANY SUCH WEAPONS. BUT, TO KIMMITT'S KNOWLEDGE (WHICH HE SAID WAS INCOMPLETE, SINCE HE WAS NOT PRIVY TO EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY), THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQ: AND HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER IT HAD EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED.

US REACTIONS TO IRAQI ATTACK ON JORDAN.

22. I THEN ASKED ABOUT SCOWCROFT'S COMMENT THAT AN IRAQI ATTACK ON JORDAN WOULD BE REGARDED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SEEN NO SIGNS THAT IRAQ WAS PLANNING TO MOVE AGAINST JORDAN, BUT WERE ANXIOUS TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO PREVENT THIS BECOMING A US/ISRAEL/THE WEST VERSUS THE ARABS DISPUTE.

ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION

23. I SAID THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME CONFUSION ABOUT ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION (MY TELNO 1909, NOT TO ALL): THE AMERICANS WERE NOW APPARENTLY CONSIDERING A SECOND LETTER, REFLECTING THE KUWAITI REQUEST. WE HAD NOT LODGED OUR NOTIFICATION, AND DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE OUR REQUEST FROM KUWAIT UNTIL 13 AUGUST AT THE EARLIEST.

24. KIMMITT, WHO WAS UNAWARE OF THE PLAN FOR A SECOND AMERICAN LETTER, IMMEDIATELY GAVE INSTRUCTIONS (WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISERS HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO US) THAT THE SECOND LETTER SHOULD NOT BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL THE QUOTE BRITS UNQUOTE HAD SIGNED ON. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO SIDES MOVED IN STEP, AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD PROBABLY NOW WAIT UNTIL WE HAD RECEIVED OUR REQUEST FROM THE EMIR: IN ANY EVENT, THEY WOULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT OUR SAY SO.

DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT

25. I GAVE KIMMITT, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, A COPY OF KUWAIT TELNO 354. KIMMITT PROMISED TO LET US HAVE US VIEWS ON THIS AS SOON AS THEY HAD BEEN REFINED.

26. HE THEN ASKED ME MORE GENERALLY WHAT BRITISH THINKING WAS ON MAINTAINING A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT. THE US INSTINCT WAS TO MOVE OUT AS MANY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, LEAVING ONLY A CORE BEHIND. THE AMERICAN CONCERN WAS THAT DIPLOMATS PRESENTED A MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR HOSTAGE-TAKING/TERRORISM THAN ORDINARY CIVILIANS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, KIMMITT SAID HE THOUGHT THE US PRESS WOULD UNDERSTAND IF THE US DECIDED TO MOVE DIPLOMATS OUT IF ITS BEST

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EFFORTS TO SECURE FREE PASSAGE FOR US NATIONALS HAD FAILED. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS.

FREEZING OF KUWAITI ASSETS

27. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT WHAT THE US HAD BEEN DOING ABOUT UNFREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS TO BE USED BY KUWAITI MISSIONS ETC (YOUR TELNO 1405, NOT TO ALL).

28. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE BASIS FOR US THINKING WAS THAT THE FREEZE WAS PROTECTIVE. IF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI AUTHORITIES WISHED TO USE THOSE ASSETS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, IT WAS NOT FOR THE US AUTHORITIES TO QUESTION WHETHER THAT USE WAS JUSTIFIED. THEY HAD THEREFORE GIVEN A GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR THE RUNNING OF KUWAITI MISSIONS. THEY WERE DISCUSSING WITH THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HERE (WHOM THE AMERICANS HAD FOUND A RELIABLE INTERLOCUTOR) HOW MUCH NEEDED TO BE RELEASED FOR OTHER KUWAITI GOVERNMENT PURPOSES. THE US TREASURY (KIMMITT MENTIONED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, ROBSON) HAD BEEN TOLD TO UNFREEZE FOR THE KUWAITIS WHATEVER THEY ASKED FOR WITHIN REASON. THE TREASURY WOULD, HOWEVER, REPORT ANY EXTRAORDINARY REQUEST.

29. KIMMITT ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQI DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK HAD BEEN EXEMPTED FROM THE GENERAL FREEZE ON IRAQI ASSETS.

IRAQI AIRWAYS

30. FINALLY, STRESSING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, I MENTIONED TO KIMMITT THAT AIRLINE SOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD PICKED UP A SUGGESTION THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WERE PRESSING IRAQI AIRWAYS AND THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON TO TRY TO TRANSFER CASH TO IRAQ.

31. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PICKED UP SIMILAR REPORTS, AND WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT ONE THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS WERE PLANNING TO MOVE A SUBSTANTIAL SUM IN STOLEN LIQUID KUWAITI ASSETS OUT OF IRAQ. THE US VIEW WAS THAT UNSCR 661 PROHIBITED ALL ACTIVITY BY IRAQI AIRWAYS IN ANY COUNTRY. AN INTER-AGENCY GROUP WAS CONSIDERING A SEPARATE ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR MOVING AGAINST IRAQ AIRWAYS: AND THE FBI HAD ALREADY CLOSED IRAQI AIRWAYS OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES. KIMMITT ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED BY ANY REPORTS THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS WERE CONTINUING TO OPERATE IN BRITAIN OR ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY: WHAT WAS THE POSITION? GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

32. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 131200Z FCO

TELNO 1490

OF 131108Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, KUWAIT

ADVANCE COPY

FCO TELS 1425/26: IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV AND SOVIET  
ATTITUDE

## SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE CONVEYED VIA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, BELONOGOV. BELONOGOV DISTANCES SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM EARLIER IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE ALSO CONTRADICTS WEEKEND TASS STATEMENT ABOUT EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS FROM IRAQ: NO AGREEMENT YET GIVEN BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SEEKS OUR VIEWS ON SITUATION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

2. SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT UN MACHINERY AND MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

## DETAIL

3. I WAS GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BELONOGOV EARLY ON 13 AUGUST TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV IN TUR.

4. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, STRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. I UNDERLINED THE VALUE OF CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE FIVE AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET ROLE. BELONOGOV EXPRESSED RECIPROCAL SATISFACTION AT EFFECTIVE JOINT ACTION IN NEW YORK, AND PRAISED THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

5. BELONOGOV THAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT 'VIEWED WITH UNDERSTANDING' THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE UNITED STATES TO DEPLOY FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE EXPRESSED SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DECISION BY OTHER STATES TO DO LIKEWISE, AT THE INVITATION OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. AND HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY ARAB GOVERNMENT'S AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

6. I ASKED ABOUT KING FAHD'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO SEND ITS OWN FORCES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH

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DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE USSR STOOD CLEARLY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST CONTINUE TO CONCERN ITSELF CLOSELY WITH THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

7. I INVITED BELONOGOV TO EXPAND ON SOVIET STATEMENTS IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 'REBIRTH' OF THE MSC, GIVEN THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AFTER THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR. HE HOPED THAT THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD SERIOUSLY REVIEW THIS OPPORTUNITY. HE DID NOT WISH TO GO INTO MORE DETAIL BECAUSE SHEVARDNADZE WAS CONSIDERING SENDING YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE, PERHAPS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, ON THIS SUBJECT. WE COMMENTED THAT A MESSAGE IN WHATEVER FORM SHEDDING MORE LIGHT ON SOVIET THINKING WOULD BE TIMELY. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE WOULD BE IN BALANCING THE MERITS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST A NEED FOR URGENT EFFECTIVE ACTION, WHICH CUMBERSOME UN PROCEDURES COULD VITIATE. BUT WE AND OTHERS WERE OBVIOUSLY READY TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL NEEDS. BELONOGOV CONCLUDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO WORK OUT A ROLE FOR THE UN: HE EXPECTED THIS PROBLEM TO BE WITH US FOR WEEKS AND MONTHS.

8. REVERTING TO THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, I EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MFA SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ON 9 AUGUST HAD DESCRIBED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE BUILD-UP OF TENSION. BELONOGOV DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM HIS MINISTRY'S SPOKESMAN. THESE DAYS, SOVIET MASS MEDIA REPORTS NO LONGER REPRESENTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL POSITION. HE REITERATED, WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS, HIS EARLIER REMARK ABOUT SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION. HE ADDED THAT CAREFUL NOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESCRIPTION OF THE PURELY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE STATES DEPLOYING FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WERE NOT INTENDING TO INITIATE MILITARY OPERATIONS. I DESCRIBED OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER.

#### EVACUATION

9. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 11 AUGUST (MY TELNO 1488), AND UNDERLINED THE CONTINUING VALUE OF VERY CLOSE COORDINATION ON THIS ASPECT. BELONOGOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN INTENDING TO MEET THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE DURING THE DAY TO DISCUSS THE IRAQI ORDER TO CLOSE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. IN THE EVENT, THE FRENCHMAN HAD CALLED ON HIM ON 12 AUGUST: HE WOULD SEE THE AMERICAN AND THE CHINESE LATER TODAY. HE WISHED TO SEEK OUR VIEWS ON THE 'CONCRETE QUESTION' OF HOW

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TO DEAL WITH IRAQ'S DEMAND. AS THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT RECOGNISE IRAQ'S ANNEXATION, IT COULD NOT JURIDICALLY ACCEDE TO THE DEMAND TO CLOSE ITS EMBASSY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE COMPETING PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE ALREADY SEEKING TO EVACUATE THEIR CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, SAVE FOR SOME EMBASSY STAFF. THE SITUATION THERE WAS TENSE AND LIKELY TO DETERIORATE. THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING FOOD AND WATER WAS GROWING, AND COULD ONLY BE EXACERBATED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE AIR AND SEA PORTS. KUWAIT DEPENDED ON IMPORTED FOOD. IRAQ ALSO IMPORTED MUCH FOOD. IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IRAQ, UNDER SANCTIONS, WOULD SUPPLY KUWAIT. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF HIS PEOPLE, WITH SHOOTING CONTINUING AND IRAQI SOLDIERS BEHAVING COARSELY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT IRAQI ASSURANCES OF THE SAFETY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN KUWAIT. MOST OF THE 880 SOVIET CITIZENS IN KUWAIT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED ON ECONOMIC PROJECTS WHICH HAD NOW STOPPED, GIVING THEM NO REASON TO STAY.

10. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO EVACUATE MOST OF ITS CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, BUT THE EVACUATION HAD NOT/NOT STARTED. A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR USE OF THE AIRPORT AND SEAPORT HAD BEEN REFUSED. THE ONLY ROUTE LAY OVERLAND. THIS RAISED COMPLICATED TRANSPORT PROBLEMS, GIVEN THE DISTANCE AND SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPED TO COME UP WITH A PLAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO HAVE A UNITED POSITION ON THE KUWAIT ASPECT.

11. SO THAT I CAN REPLY, GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON OUR INTENTIONS OVER THE KUWAIT EMBASSY, AND ANY FURTHER POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO PUT TO THE MFA ON KUWAIT.

12. TURNING TO EVACUATION FROM IRAQ, BELONOGOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT/NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION TO TRY TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS FROM IRAQ, EXCEPT FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. HE 'HOPED' THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT THIS.

13. I ASKED ABOUT THE TASS REPORT THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED TO THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET FAMILIES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN REACHED WITH IRAQ. THE TASS ACCOUNT WAS PARTIALLY WRONG. THE SITUATION IN BAGHDAD WAS VERY COMPLICATED, AND DECISIONS WERE MADE ONE DAY AND CHANGED THE NEXT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS CONTINUING TO PRESS THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I REGRETTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PUT THEIR NAMES TO THE 9 AUGUST JOINT DEMARCHE. BELONOGOV SAID THEY WERE IN A SPECIAL SITUATION IN IRAQ: THEY HAD 'TOO MANY PEOPLE THERE'.

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15. ON A PERSONAL BASIS, WE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET MFA MIGHT CONVEENE A REGULAR CONSULTATIVE GROUP OF THE MAJOR INTERESTED EMBASSIES AT WORKING LEVEL, TO POOL INFORMATION IN MOSCOW (AND SAVE THE MFA THE TIME TAKEN UP BY INDIVIDUAL CALLS): BELONOGOV WAS SHY OF THIS. HE THOUGHT IT BETTER FOR COORDINATION TO BE CENTRED IN THE GROUP IN WASHINGTON. FOR THE TIME BEING, HIS WISH WAS TO CONCENTRATE HERE ONLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE CLOSURE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

THE WAY AHEAD.

16. BELONOGOV THOUGHT THE CRISIS HAD NOW REACHED A MOMENT OF RELATIVE CALM, THOUGH THIS COULD OF COURSE BE THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM. THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE TO USE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEASURES TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT, SO THAT NO ONE COULD THINK THAT ANY SINGLE COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES WAS TAKING INTO ITS OWN HANDS MATTERS WHICH PROPERLY LAY WITH THE UN. ALL RELEVANT DECISIONS - POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY - WOULD BEST BE TAKEN UNDER UN AUSPICES. WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO THE US DEPLOYMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

COMMENT.

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FCO TELS 1425/26: IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

## SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE CONVEYED VIA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, BELONOGOV. BELONOGOV DISTANCES SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM EARLIER IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE ALSO CONTRADICTS WEEKEND TASS STATEMENT ABOUT EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS FROM IRAQ: NO AGREEMENT YET GIVEN BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SEEKS OUR VIEWS ON SITUATION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

2. SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT UN MACHINERY AND MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

## DETAIL

3. I WAS GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BELONOGOV EARLY ON 13 AUGUST TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV IN TUR.

4. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, STRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. I UNDERLINED THE VALUE OF CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE FIVE AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET ROLE. BELONOGOV EXPRESSED RECIPROCAL SATISFACTION AT EFFECTIVE JOINT ACTION IN NEW YORK, AND PRAISED THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

5. BELONOGOV THEN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT 'VIEWED WITH UNDERSTANDING' THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE UNITED STATES TO DEPLOY FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE EXPRESSED SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DECISION BY OTHER STATES TO DO LIKEWISE, AT THE INVITATION OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. AND HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY ARAB GOVERNMENT'S AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

6. I ASKED ABOUT KING FAHD'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO SEND ITS OWN FORCES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH

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DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE USSR STOOD CLEARLY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST CONTINUE TO CONCERN ITSELF CLOSELY WITH THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

7. I INVITED BELONOGOV TO EXPAND ON SOVIET STATEMENTS IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 'REBIRTH' OF THE MSC, GIVEN THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AFTER THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR. HE HOPED THAT THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD SERIOUSLY REVIEW THIS OPPORTUNITY. HE DID NOT WISH TO GO INTO MORE DETAIL BECAUSE SHEVARDNADZE WAS CONSIDERING SENDING YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE, PERHAPS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, ON THIS SUBJECT. WE COMMENTED THAT A MESSAGE IN WHATEVER FORM SHEDDING MORE LIGHT ON SOVIET THINKING WOULD BE TIMELY. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE WOULD BE IN BALANCING THE MERITS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST A NEED FOR URGENT EFFECTIVE ACTION, WHICH CUMBERSOME UN PROCEDURES COULD VITIATE. BUT WE AND OTHERS WERE OBVIOUSLY READY TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL NEEDS. BELONOGOV CONCLUDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO WORK OUT A ROLE FOR THE UN: HE EXPECTED THIS PROBLEM TO BE WITH US FOR WEEKS AND MONTHS.

8. REVERTING TO THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, I EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MFA SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ON 9 AUGUST HAD DESCRIBED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE BUILD-UP OF TENSION. BELONOGOV DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM HIS MINISTRY'S SPOKESMAN. THESE DAYS, SOVIET MASS MEDIA REPORTS NO LONGER REPRESENTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL POSITION. HE REITERATED, WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS, HIS EARLIER REMARK ABOUT SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION. HE ADDED THAT CAREFUL NOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESCRIPTION OF THE PURELY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE STATES DEPLOYING FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WERE NOT INTENDING TO INITIATE MILITARY OPERATIONS. I DESCRIBED OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER.

## EVACUATION

9. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 11 AUGUST (MY TELNO 1488), AND UNDERLINED THE CONTINUING VALUE OF VERY CLOSE COORDINATION ON THIS ASPECT. BELONOGOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN INTENDING TO MEET THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE DURING THE DAY TO DISCUSS THE IRAQI ORDER TO CLOSE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. IN THE EVENT, THE FRENCHMAN HAD CALLED ON HIM ON 12 AUGUST: HE WOULD SEE THE AMERICAN AND THE CHINESE LATER TODAY. HE WISHED TO SEEK OUR VIEWS ON THE 'CONCRETE QUESTION' OF HOW

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TO DEAL WITH IRAQ'S DEMAND. AS THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT RECOGNISE IRAQ'S ANNEXATION, IT COULD NOT JURIDICALLY ACCEDE TO THE DEMAND TO CLOSE ITS EMBASSY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE COMPETING PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE ALREADY SEEKING TO EVACUATE THEIR CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, SAVE FOR SOME EMBASSY STAFF. THE SITUATION THERE WAS TENSE AND LIKELY TO DETERIORATE. THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING FOOD AND WATER WAS GROWING, AND COULD ONLY BE EXACERBATED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE AIR AND SEA PORTS. KUWAIT DEPENDED ON IMPORTED FOOD. IRAQ ALSO IMPORTED MUCH FOOD. IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IRAQ, UNDER SANCTIONS, WOULD SUPPLY KUWAIT. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF HIS PEOPLE, WITH SHOOTING CONTINUING AND IRAQI SOLDIERS BEHAVING COARSELY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT IRAQI ASSURANCES OF THE SAFETY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN KUWAIT. MOST OF THE 880 SOVIET CITIZENS IN KUWAIT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED ON ECONOMIC PROJECTS WHICH HAD NOW STOPPED, GIVING THEM NO REASON TO STAY.

10. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO EVACUATE MOST OF ITS CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, BUT THE EVACUATION HAD NOT/NOT STARTED. A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR USE OF THE AIRPORT AND SEAPORT HAD BEEN REFUSED. THE ONLY ROUTE LAY OVERLAND. THIS RAISED COMPLICATED TRANSPORT PROBLEMS, GIVEN THE DISTANCE AND SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPED TO COME UP WITH A PLAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO HAVE A UNITED POSITION ON THE KUWAIT ASPECT.

11. SO THAT I CAN REPLY, GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON OUR INTENTIONS OVER THE KUWAIT EMBASSY, AND ANY FURTHER POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO PUT TO THE MFA ON KUWAIT.

12. TURNING TO EVACUATION FROM IRAQ, BELONOGOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT/NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION TO TRY TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS FROM IRAQ, EXCEPT FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. HE 'HOPED' THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT THIS.

13. I ASKED ABOUT THE TASS REPORT THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED TO THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET FAMILIES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN REACHED WITH IRAQ. THE TASS ACCOUNT WAS PARTIALLY WRONG. THE SITUATION IN BAGHDAD WAS VERY COMPLICATED, AND DECISIONS WERE MADE ONE DAY AND CHANGED THE NEXT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS CONTINUING TO PRESS THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I REGRETTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PUT THEIR NAMES TO THE 9 AUGUST JOINT DEMARCHE. BELONOGOV SAID THEY WERE IN A SPECIAL SITUATION IN IRAQ: THEY HAD 'TOO MANY PEOPLE THERE'.

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15. ON A PERSONAL BASIS, WE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET MFA MIGHT CONVENE A REGULAR CONSULTATIVE GROUP OF THE MAJOR INTERESTED EMBASSIES AT WORKING LEVEL, TO POOL INFORMATION IN MOSCOW (AND SAVE THE MFA THE TIME TAKEN UP BY INDIVIDUAL CALLS): BELONOGOV WAS SHY OF THIS. HE THOUGHT IT BETTER FOR COORDINATION TO BE CENTRED IN THE GROUP IN WASHINGTON. FOR THE TIME BEING, HIS WISH WAS TO CONCERT HERE ONLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE CLOSURE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

THE WAY AHEAD.

16. BELONOGOV THOUGHT THE CRISIS HAD NOW REACHED A MOMENT OF RELATIVE CALM, THOUGH THIS COULD OF COURSE BE THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM. THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE TO USE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEASURES TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT, SO THAT NO ONE COULD THINK THAT ANY SINGLE COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES WAS TAKING INTO ITS OWN HANDS MATTERS WHICH PROPERLY LAY WITH THE UN. ALL RELEVANT DECISIONS - POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY - WOULD BEST BE TAKEN UNDER UN AUSPICES. WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO THE US DEPLOYMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 August 1990

*Dear Dominic,*

## IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has raised four points on which it would be helpful to have early comments from the FCO and MOD:

- ✓ (i) she is keen to get the blockade (or 'interdiction', as the Americans have it) going. My understanding is that the Americans have their request from the Kuwaitis, and are poised to start. We hope to receive a request today. The Prime Minister wants to know when we start allocating duties between navies: decide which countries will interdict in the Red Sea and which in the Gulf: what the coordinating mechanism will be and so on.
- (ii) the Prime Minister believes that we must constantly be putting the case against Saddam Hussein, as Mr. Waldegrave did very effectively yesterday. We must get out details of his appallingly brutal record. The FCO and other agencies should work up a fully documented brief, perhaps in collaboration with the Americans.  
*Answer by FCO*
- ✓ (iii) on the military side, the Prime Minister wants to know what rules apply to hot pursuit across the Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders in the event of penetration and/or attacks by Iraqi aircraft. Is that covered by existing ROE? Or should we extend the ROE to cover such eventualities?
- ✓ (iv) the Prime Minister would also like to see a considered military view on how we (and the Americans) would respond to a chemical attack, either on our forces or on Saudi installations.

1+1  
2 It would be helpful to have at least a preliminary view on these points by this evening and a fuller report by tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence), Julian Miller (Mr. Hamilton's Office, Ministry of Defence), and to Sir Robin Butler.

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*Yours sincerely,*  
C.D. POWELL

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SECRET UK EYES A



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LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155  
Direct line 071-828 1386

13 August 1990

Ms J R Binstead  
Private Office  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON S W 1

*Dear Ms Binstead*

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO

The Attorney General has seen your letter to me of 11 August asking for his views on certain questions from the Secretary of State for Defence. He has also had the benefit of the oral views of FCO Legal Advisers.

The Attorney has already advised that in the absence of a further UN resolution which expressly authorised the use of force in enforcing the oil embargo, measures for that purpose which were taken in response to a request from the legitimate Government of Kuwait could be justified in principle by reference to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, as preserved by Article 51 of the Charter.

To act on the request of a State whose flag ship is believed to be infringing the embargo would provide an alternative legal justification for Royal Navy operations. The RN would in effect be acting on behalf of the flag State in enforcing the latter's domestic law.

The Attorney advises that if any request made by a third State were to be acted upon by an RN ship, then the requested degree of force could not be exceeded, and secondly the request would have had to be accompanied by an indemnity against any civil liability arising from such action. Even then

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such an indemnity might prove unreliable when tested in the courts of the foreign jurisdiction.

The Attorney considers that such advantage as may be derived from gaining an alternative legal justification by these means is heavily outweighed by the consequential implication that there is something wrong with the Article 51 justification.

The Attorney does not consider that the position is any different if the flag State concerned was a member of the Security Council.

As a general principle, the Attorney is of the view that it remains highly desirable that in the context of legal justification for our actions we maintain a common footing with the US and our other allies.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Stephen Wall, Simon Whiteley and Sonia Phippard. I am also copying to Frank Berman (FCO Legal Advisers) and to Peter Ellis (MOD Legal Advisers).

*Yours faithfully*  
*E S Wilmshurst*

E S WILMSHURST

SECRET UK EYES A



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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15S

13th August 1990

Answers to some of the questions which you put  
Dear Charles, yesterday. On naval operations, the RN would scour inside the Gulf & the USN would operate a quarantine outside the Straits of ~~Hormuz~~.  
IRAQ/KUWAIT I will see if I can find

You wrote to Dominic Asquith this morning about four subjects raised by the Prime Minister.

cut more from Brent scanner about the

The question of putting the case against Saddam Hussein is, of course, one on which the Foreign Office should lead but the MOD has a number of comments on the Prime Minister's other points. This reply has been agreed by my Secretary of State but it has not been possible, in the time available, to discuss these with other Government Departments.

planned US response to chemical.

① First, on the question of intercepting ships, after discussions with the US it appears that the most effective RN contribution, at least initially, would be to provide two ships to patrol inside the Gulf working in cooperation with the USN vessels stationed outside the Strait of Hormuz. The concept is explained more fully in the attached paper. RN surveillance operations have already begun in the Gulf and this co-operative arrangement could begin to operate within two days, subject to finalisation of practical details with the USN in the Gulf. (This is in hand.) At present we have no indications that there are any suspect vessels in the Gulf area.

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If enforcement action is to be fully effective ROE permitting the use of force, if necessary, will be required. Detailed ROE are being prepared, developed from those agreed in principle by OD(G) last week; these will be submitted tomorrow. To strengthen further the basis for enforcement action and for presentational reasons it might also be helpful to secure the agreement of major flag states that the RN may, if necessary, stop, board and search any of their vessels suspected of sanction breaking.

This concept of operations would also allow the ARMILLA patrol to maintain existing roles in support of British shipping and the

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

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Gulf states. The current Iraqi threat is not judged sufficient to warrant the reintroduction of accompaniment of merchant shipping, although once shipping resumes use of the Saudi ports of Al Jubail and Ras Tanura it will be necessary to extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30'N. With 3 DD/FF deployed to the area, a sustainable patrol level is 2 DD/FF on operations in the Persian Gulf with 1 DD/FF stood down to the Gulf of Oman or a Gulf port at 24 hours notice, carrying out maintenance or showing a diplomatic presence.

The attached paper also discusses the need for international collaboration to collect and disseminate merchant ship intelligence. We believe that the UK is well placed to assume this focal role, which would also have the advantage of broadening the multinational nature of the naval operations in the Gulf. The Secretary of State has given instructions that this should be pursued urgently in consultation with the US.

② As far as pursuit of Iraqi aircraft is concerned, it was agreed following Simon Webb's letter of 9 August that UK aircraft would not fly over or within 25 miles of the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Republic of Yemen or Jordanian borders. Once Iraqi aircraft had carried out offensive action against targets on friendly territory or attacked our own or friendly aircraft, it would no longer be appropriate to impose such restrictions on our activities. We are considering as a matter of urgency how we should extend the ROE in the event of such aggression but we will need to consult the FCO and the Law Officers' Department. The proposed changes will be circulated shortly with a view to seeking automatic implementation of revised ROE in the event of further aggression.

③ Finally, so far as the response to a chemical attack is concerned, the UK would be concerned to ensure that a response was measured, sent the right political message and was proportionate to the Iraqi attack. We should, of course, need to bear in mind our responsibilities and undertakings as set out in the Negative Security Assurance. The UK has no assets in the theatre of operations which could, by themselves, deliver an effective response to an Iraqi chemical attack. The Jaguar aircraft could form part of an offensive force but they are essentially ground support aircraft. Any conventional response against fixed targets would, therefore, have to be US led. It could cover the range from pin point attacks to saturation bombing, depending on intelligence current at the time.

Tornado GR1 strike aircraft could be deployed to the Gulf to take part in a strike on Iraqi chemical production facilities and delivery systems. The number of aircraft required and the protection needed (such as defence suppression) to destroy an Iraqi chemical production facility would require further study and depend on the precise target. The Defence Secretary has instructed that

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this be set in hand. Any operation would take a few days to mount once political approval had been received, and would need to be co-ordinated in-theatre.

Our current understanding is that the US response plans envisage conventional retaliation using B52s from Diego Garcia and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Carrier Battle Groups. It could also include F111s from Turkey and F16s from the Gulf. We do not, however, have details of their plans and have been advised that the correct approach for information of this nature would be from you to Brent Scowcroft.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (FCO), Elisabeth Wilmschurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

*Janet Binstead*

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)  
Private Secretary

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Prime Minister

13th August 1990

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You wrote to Dominic Asquith this morning about four subjects raised by the Prime Minister.

cut more from Bent Sowerby about the

The question of putting the case against Saddam Hussein is, of course, one on which the Foreign Office should lead but the MOD has a number of comments on the Prime Minister's other points. This reply has been agreed by my Secretary of State but it has not been possible, in the time available, to discuss these with other Government Departments.

planned US response to chemical.

First, on the question of intercepting ships, after discussions with the US it appears that the most effective RN contribution, at least initially, would be to provide two ships to patrol inside the Gulf working in cooperation with the USN vessels stationed outside the Strait of Hormuz. The concept is explained more fully in the attached paper. RN surveillance operations have already begun in the Gulf and this co-operative arrangement could begin to operate within two days, subject to finalisation of practical details with the USN in the Gulf. (This is in hand.) At present we have no indications that there are any suspect vessels in the Gulf area.

COP  
14/8.

If enforcement action is to be fully effective ROE permitting the use of force, if necessary, will be required. Detailed ROE are being prepared, developed from those agreed in principle by OD(G) last week; these will be submitted tomorrow. To strengthen further the basis for enforcement action and for presentational reasons it might also be helpful to secure the agreement of major flag states that the RN may, if necessary, stop, board and search any of their vessels suspected of sanction breaking.

This concept of operations would also allow the ARMILLA patrol to maintain existing roles in support of British shipping and the

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Gulf states. The current Iraqi threat is not judged sufficient to warrant the reintroduction of accompaniment of merchant shipping, although once shipping resumes use of the Saudi ports of Al Jubail and Ras Tanura it will be necessary to extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30' N. With 3 DD/FF deployed to the area, a sustainable patrol level is 2 DD/FF on operations in the Persian Gulf with 1 DD/FF stood down to the Gulf of Oman or a Gulf port at 24 hours notice, carrying out maintenance or showing a diplomatic presence.

The attached paper also discusses the need for international collaboration to collect and disseminate merchant ship intelligence. We believe that the UK is well placed to assume this local role, which would also have the advantage of broadening the multinational nature of the naval operations in the Gulf. The Secretary of State has given instructions that this should be pursued urgently in consultation with the US.

2 As far as pursuit of Iraqi aircraft is concerned, it was agreed following Simon Webb's letter of 9 August that UK aircraft would not fly over or within 25 miles of the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Republic of Yemen or Jordanian borders. Once Iraqi aircraft had carried out offensive action against targets on friendly territory or attacked our own or friendly aircraft, it would no longer be appropriate to impose such restrictions on our activities. We are considering as a matter of urgency how we should extend the ROE in the event of such aggression but we will need to consult the FCO and the Law Officers' Department. The proposed changes will be circulated shortly with a view to seeking automatic implementation of revised ROE in the event of further aggression.

3 Finally, so far as the response to a chemical attack is concerned, the UK would be concerned to ensure that a response was measured, sent the right political message and was proportionate to the Iraqi attack. We should, of course, need to bear in mind our responsibilities and undertakings as set out in the Negative Security Assurance. The UK has no assets in the theatre of operations which could, by themselves, deliver an effective response to an Iraqi chemical attack. The Jaguar aircraft could form part of an offensive force but they are essentially ground support aircraft. Any conventional response against fixed targets would, therefore, have to be US led. It could cover the range from pin point attacks to saturation bombing, depending on intelligence current at the time.

Tornado GR1 strike aircraft could be deployed to the Gulf to take part in a strike on Iraqi chemical production facilities and delivery systems. The number of aircraft required and the protection needed (such as defence suppression) to destroy an Iraqi chemical production facility would require further study and depend on the precise target. The Defence Secretary has instructed that

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this be set in hand. Any operation would take a few days to mount once political approval had been received, and would need to be co-ordinated in-theatre.

Our current understanding is that the US response plans envisage conventional retaliation using B52s from Diego Garcia and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Carrier Battle Groups. It could also include F111s from Turkey and F16s from the Gulf. We do not, however, have details of their plans and have been advised that the correct approach for information of this nature would be from you to Brent Scowcroft.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (FCO), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

*Janet Binstead*

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)  
Private Secretary

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1(A-B)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/50

13 August 1990

APS/Secretary of State

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 13/8

IRAQ/KUWAIT

Minister(DP) has seen Charles Powell's letter to Dominic Asquith of 13 August 1990. Mr Clark would like a number of points to be taken into account in drafting a response. He would also like them to be borne in mind more generally in the formulation of operational activity in the Gulf:

a. Naval units and aircraft should always be armed unless particular circumstances make this impossible; this applies in particular to the MCMVs which, because of their very shallow draft, are ideally suited to intercepting coastal shipping in waters which would be hazardous for larger naval units;

b. While accepting the paramountcy of our close integration at command level with the United States Navy, it is important to bear in mind that the various European contingents are reluctant to accede to this arrangement in the same degree (or, in the case of the French, not at all). In conversation between Mr Clark and the Dutch Defence Minister this morning, this point was made very plain but the Dutch Minister did imply he would be quite ready to subordinate Dutch Naval units to an overall RN command and he believed that the other European Navies would be also of this view;

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
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c. As far as possible, legal restraints on hot pursuit and analogous action should be moderated so as to leave the decision in the hands of the senior officer on the spot which, in the case of aircraft, could mean the commander of the aircraft actually engaged. The question of hot pursuit cannot sensibly be considered

i. until the existing 25 mile restriction is lifted and

ii. appropriate defence suppression equipment, preferably under RAF command, is in place.

2. Mr Clark has not yet had sight of the full arguments against dispatch of a CVS to the theatre, although he understands that ARK ROYAL is at 48hrs notice. If a full defence suppression capability under sovereign control is to be put in place, this will mean at least one squadron of Harrier GR5s. Operational experience has shown that the CVS is a very useful adjunct to a mixed deployment of GR5s or Sea Harrier. However, he recognises that a CVS is a major Naval asset and, for this reason, would be particularly interested to see the advice which lay behind last week's decision.



D R A HATCHER  
APS/Minister(DP)

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL):

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PUBLIC COMMENTS BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS  
SUMMARY

1. BAKER, CHENEY AND SCOWCROFT APPEAR ON THE TV NETWORKS' QUOTE NEWSMAKER UNQUOTE SUNDAY PROGRAMMES.

DETAIL

2. SECRETARIES BAKER AND CHENEY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SCOWCROFT EACH GAVE INTERVIEWS TODAY (12 AUGUST) TO THE THREE MAJOR TV NETWORKS' SUNDAY CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES. THEY ALL STRESSED THAT THE US TROOP BUILD UP, AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, WERE AT THE REQUEST OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS WERE A DEFENSIVE MEASURE AND A DETERRENT TO FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION IN THE REGION. ALL THREE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN AS TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF US FORCES LIKELY TO BE DEPLOYED OR WHAT FUTURE MILITARY OPTIONS MIGHT BE OPEN TO THE PRESIDENT. QUOTE I WOULD NOT WANT TO PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT THE US RESPONSE MIGHT BE IN TERMS OF VARIOUS MILITARY CONTINGENCIES, BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE US HAS A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCE IN THE AREA, THERE IS MORE ON THE WAY, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE A RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM SHOULD HE BE REQUIRED TO USE MILITARY CAPABILITY UNQUOTE (CHENEY). THEY WERE ALSO CAREFUL NOT TO PREDICT ANY TIMEFRAME FOR SANCTIONS TO BITE OR HOW LONG US FORCES WERE LIKELY TO REMAIN. THEY ALL REFERRED TO THE UNPRECEDENTED WORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION OF SADDAM AND SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS. THERE WAS PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR US (AND OTHER) CITIZENS WHO WERE BEING PREVENTED FROM LEAVING IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

3. BAKER ANNOUNCED THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM KUWAIT FOR SUPPORT TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS: QUOTE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT HAS JUST REQUESTED OF US AND OTHER NATIONS SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. IN OTHER WORDS THEY HAVE MADE THE FORMAL REQUEST NOW THAT IS NEEDED UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO HAVE A LEGAL BASIS FOR STOPPING

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THE EXPORT OF OIL AND THAT SORT OF THING ... WE NOW HAVE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERDICTING THOSE KINDS OF SHIPMENTS ... WE NOW HAVE A FORMAL REQUEST TO IMPLEMENT THOSE SANCTIONS AND WE INTEND TO DO THAT ... THE MEASURES THAT WE USE WILL BE THOSE MEASURES THAT ARE NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. UNQUOTE.

4. SCOWCROFT, REFERRING TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DESCRIBED THEM AS A TERROR WEAPON AND THAT THEIR USE WOULD BE TAKEN VERY, VERY SERIOUSLY. HE AGREED THAT ITS (CW) EFFECT AGAINST UNPROTECTED CIVILIANS OR TROOPS WOULD HAVE VERY SIMILAR EFFECTS TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION, SCOWCROFT SAID QUOTE I THINK HIS (SADDAM'S) INVASION OF JORDAN WE WOULD TREAT IN A SIMILAR MANNER TO HIS INVASION OF KUWAIT. UNQUOTE.

5. FULL TEXTS BY FAX TO FCO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

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